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Abstract: The “comply or explain” principle has already acquired significant impor-
tance in corporate law and regulations and is considered to be the preferred regula-
tory tool in the EU for increasing transparency and disclosure of market participants’
strategies and activities. The flexibility of the principle is perceived as the most
suitable way to create indirect coordination of practices amongst market actors, as
well as better mutual understanding of their different priorities. Having initially
shown its considerable appeal in the area of corporate governance statements issued
by corporate entities, it has now expanded its influence into other areas serving
similar transparency imperatives, such as the exercise of stewardship responsibilities
by institutional investors and proxy advisors. In this paper, we will focus on the
merits and shortfalls of the “comply or explain” principle in all the above-mentioned
areas, both at national and at EU levels, and will critically challenge its effectiveness
in the current regulatory framework. Moreover, we will seek to justify its continued
use by demonstrating its future potential role as a veritable dialogue spectrum
between different market participants. Lastly, we will emphasise the need for a soft
monitoring process from national regulators which will enable both the “comply or
explain” principle and its users to participate in a holistic effort for the adoption of
sound investment strategies via the fruitful exchange of views and ideas and better
communication with regard to their respective role in capital markets.
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1 Introduction
The financialisation of companies, economies and societies at large is an unques-
tioned fact which has shaped, nurtured and influenced a distorted view of the
purpose of doing business and the expectations that market participants can have
fromcompanies and their investment in capitalmarkets. The ever-increasing focus on
short-term profits for all parties involved in the investment chain, their disconnection
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fromcompanies’ identity and goals, as well as the overall ramifications of business
practices on stakeholders have destabilised the foundations of modern capital-
ism. The 2007–2008 global financial crisis triggered, in a blatant way, the need for
sounder investment strategies and better communication between market actors.
Although the link between these two concepts is not necessarily straightforward,
we believe that it is more likely for long-term and sustainable investment strate-
gies to arise from an adequate communication framework between market parti-
cipants. A dialogue that includes a broader series of market participants will be
able to lead to beneficial outcomes for the whole investment community, driving
the debate beyond short-term incentives and strategies, and taking into account a
broader series of incentives and considerations. Mutual understanding and fruit-
ful interaction between various market participants has emerged as one of the
imperatives of twenty-first century regulatory trends due to the ever-increasing
communication gap and lack of engagement between companies, financial inter-
mediaries and investors.
On the one hand, short-term investment strategies focused solely on share
price return, instead of taking into account the continuity of companies and
their potential to contribute to economic growth, have shown the problematic
aspects of a narrow and speculative conception of capital markets that tends to
be dissociated from investee companies and their own existence in national
economies. This investment trend finds its roots in the “shareholder primacy”
theory that conceives of companies purely as profit-making organisations for the
exclusive benefit of their shareholders, while neglecting them as holistic entities
with a series of broader consequences on other parties affected by their activ-
ities, such as suppliers, customers and other stakeholders.1
On many occasions, corporate boards have been subject to short-term
pressures from institutional investors and, as will be explained later in this
paper, tend to align their strategies with the investment agendas of various
groups in order to raise capital and remain attractive on capital markets,
which have historically functioned under the efficient market hypothesis
1 For a very interesting deconstruction of the shareholder primacy model and the defence of the
firm as an enterprise entity with a wider conceptual framework, see Biondi (2013, p. 397).
2 The debate continues on the existence of empirical proof of the benefits of shareholder
engagement. The empirical studies conducted in the past are not conclusive as to whether
shareholder activism is crucial to improving companies’ performance or simply irrelevant.
Regardless of the negative or positive effect of this kind of activism, it could be said that in
theory it is always better to have a certain amount of indirect pressure from asset managers or
asset owners of the shares, which will possibly alert the company’s management and avert
certain deficiencies in conducting business: Gillan and Starks (2007); Demiralp, D’Mello,
Schlingemann, and Subramaniam (2011); Romano (2001).
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(Fama, 1970) and the “shareholder primacy” doctrine. Although some investor
groups have shown willingness to engage with boards effectively,2 others have
damaged the stability of companies and the market in general since they only
invest with short-term return objectives and the achievement of specific goals,
which are clearly not compatible with the sustainable existence of a company
and do not involve any element of communication (Heineman, 2010).
On the other hand, the interaction between boards and institutional investors in
this context is not clear since the predominance of institutional investment has not
always been associated with effective engagement with boards and fruitful discus-
sion of the future of the company. The quasi-automatic alternation and diversifica-
tion of portfolio investments might seem to be a preferable investment strategy
because it saves investors from being engaged in lengthy and time-consuming
discussions with companies. What is even worse, institutional investor apathy
makes the communication factor even more problematic for future regulatory
agendas since investors tend to prefer the above-mentioned portfolio diversification
in order to mitigate market risk, therefore becoming reluctant to invest time and
resources to engage with every single investee company.3
The problems mentioned above and related to a lack of engagement and
inappropriate short-term strategies can be eventually overcome by the development
of a disclosure trend covering a vast area of market actors and inviting them, in a
flexible regulatory framework, tomake visible their practices and conception of their
role in capital markets. Therefore, the adoption of soft law measures, allowing
different parties to disclose their strategies and activities, has traditionally been
considered the preferred regulatory tool that has genuine potential to bring together
different kinds of information, resulting gradually but steadily in indirect coordina-
tion between various market practices and mutual understanding of their respective
needs. It is thus believed that out of a flexible disclosure spectrum,market actors will
have the chance to evaluate and interact with each other in a productive way with
the ultimate goal of actively participating in a fruitful exchange of views on the
future of capital markets, while contributing to a muchmore sustainable investment
model. This kind of interaction is considered to be the only possible way to build a
long-term vision of a prosperous investment landscape, although such a system has
3 The UK government, following a call for evidence “A long-term focus for corporate Britain”
published in October 2010, asked Professor Kay in 2011 to launch a report examining to what
extent equity markets are achieving their core purposes. After a respective call for evidence and
an Interim Report, the Final Report entitled “The Kay Review of UK Equity Markets and Long-
Term Decision Making” [hereinafter the Kay Report] was published in July 2012, with a very
interesting analysis on shareholder engagement and problems associated with the increase of
financial intermediation http://www.bis.gov.uk/assets/biscore/business-law/docs/k/12-917-kay-
review-of-equity-markets-final-report.pdf accessed 10 May 2014.
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not yet proven to be the preferred one.4 The reasons for such scepticism lie within the
inherent deficiencies of mandatory disclosure which, while trying to serve highly
praised goals such as reduction of informational asymmetry and increased aware-
ness amongst market actors, might become counter-productive and burdensome.5
Also, generally debating the merits of disclosure, we must bear in mind that the
information itself might be instrumentalised by its provider when it is purely con-
ceived as a “window-dressing” exercise and not as genuine exposure and will-
ingness to make market participants more sophisticated and better informed.
The debate around the benefits of disclosure becomes even more compli-
cated if we consider that the information will probably be instrumentalised not
only by its provider but also by some of its users wishing to exploit it for purely
speculative purposes when participating in capital markets. Indeed, one of the
main arguments against more disclosure focuses on the danger of speculation
and increased short-termism which would motivate market participants to
adopt a purely myopic view of the company as a necessary means for continuing
with their speculative practices. It goes without saying that confidentiality as
well as corporate technologies and “know-how” should be carefully protected
given the substantial risk of compromising an innovative business project, and
potentially causing it to fail, if the company is required to disclose relevant
information to the market, and inevitably to its competitors, under the applic-
able regulatory framework. Whatever the overall conclusion on the merits and
deficiencies of disclosure, we believe that disclosure has a role to play, for better
or worse, not just for companies but also for other market participants.
Moreover, it is rather preoccupying that “window dressing” and speculative
practices continue to be used by, respectively, the providers and the recipients
of information disclosed under soft law frameworks. These phenomena may also
lead us to question not only the ability of soft law to shape and influence
parties’ behaviour but, most importantly, its biased connection with the finan-
cialisation of companies, economies and societies at large and its instrumenta-
lisation for the continued use of short-term and speculative practices. Therefore,
the regulatory agenda needs to channel its efforts to create a disclosure spec-
trum that can bridge the gap between the providers of information, aiming to
maintain flexibility, and the recipients of information, aiming to evaluate the
providers, without allowing either party to abuse either the framework in which
disclosure obligations operate or their content.
4 For a more general analysis on the correlation between regulatory reforms that aim to
increase shareholders’ rights and the actual improvement in shareholder activism, which
does not always seem so obvious, see Mendoza, Van der Elst, and Vermeulen (2010, pp. 29–34).
5 See the very interesting analysis of Enriques and Gilotta (2014).
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The UK, in an attempt to adopt a widely applicable soft law tool, became the
precursor in regulatory rulemaking with the introduction of the “comply or
explain” principle in the area of corporate governance codes in 1992,6 whereby
companies are required to comply with the provisions of the UK Corporate
Governance Code or to explain the reasons they have decided not to do so.
Since its initial adoption, the “comply or explain” principle has been at the
centre of attention in corporate governance-related matters and continues to be
one of the most debated issues with regard to its usefulness, effectiveness and
influence on corporations. Having proven to be a very popular regulatory tool,
for reasons which will be explained later in this paper, it has since been adopted
at the EU level with Directive 2006/46/EC,7 for corporate governance statements.
Most importantly, the European Commission and various national regulators
and industry committees, tasked with issuing best practices for their sector,
continue to emphasise the suitability of this principle and therefore keep relying
on its merits in order to proliferate and further legitimise soft law rulemaking.
Nevertheless, the “comply or explain” principle has already shown a series
of deficiencies that continue to dent its attractiveness and its persuasiveness as
the preferred regulatory tool in capital markets. These deficiencies are mainly
due to market actors’ rather superficial conception and use of the principle, in
the case of both those who are supposed to disclose their practices according to
the principle and those who are supposed to benefit from such disclosure. These
concerns combine with a considerable amount of criticism regarding the princi-
ple’s laxity for its users and the lack of enforcement in cases of non-respect.
These arguments have led the debate towards the reconsideration of soft law
measures as the most suitable regulatory means for ensuring companies’ ade-
quate compliance with a certain set of rules. Indeed, would soft law still be the
appropriate solution for tackling issues related to deviation from generally
accepted corporate governance practices? And, most importantly, is soft law in
general able to influence market participants’ behaviour and guide them
towards long-term and balanced corporate governance?
This article will therefore endeavour to analyse the success as well as the
shortfalls of this principle, while providing a novel approach not only to its
conception by regulators and market actors but also to its future role in capital
markets, which will allow all parties involved to benefit to a greater extent from
6 Sir Cadbury (1992).
7 Directive 2006/46/EC of 14 June 2006 amending Council Directives 78/660/EEC on the annual
accounts of certain types of companies, 83/349/EEC on consolidated accounts, 86/635/EEC on the
annual accounts and consolidated accounts of banks and other financial institutions and 91/674/
EEC on the annual accounts and consolidated accounts of insurance undertakings [2006] OJ L224/7.
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its use. Section 2 will give an overview of the expansion of the principle into
different fields in the broad area of corporate finance and will attempt to discern
the reason for this trend towards propagation of the principle in regulatory
methods. Section 3 will “deconstruct” the principle, providing a thorough review
and a critical analysis of its main components and the challenges currently facing
its success. Section 4 will propose a “reconstruction” of the principle based on a
series of proposals aimed at strengthening its components and justifying its
continued use in the future regulatory agenda. Section 5 will draw conclusions
from these proposals and reflect upon prospective regulatory policies.
2 The proliferation of the “comply or explain”
principle
2.1 Listed companies’ statements
Companies must adopt a corporate governance system that is not solely focused
on profit maximisation and share price return, but goes beyond these goals and
strives to achieve investment innovation, growth and economic performance. It is
in this perspective that companies will not only ensure their success and remain
attractive to other market participants8 but also continue to play a key role in
national economies. In an attempt to make corporate governance mechanisms
much more visible, via disclosure obligations expressed in corporate governance
statements, regulators found the “comply or explain” principle to be the ideal
combination of disclosure and adaptability. On the one hand, disclosure as a
principle is a theoretical catalyst for more informed and sophisticated decisions by
investors, based on the information that companies provide regarding their cor-
porate governance system. On the other hand, adaptability is a key issue with
corporate governance statements, taking into account that companies’ structures
vary widely both nationally and internationally.
The most important EU initiative on the corporate governance landscape was
the adoption of the “comply or explain” principle through Directive 2006/46/EC, as
previouslymentioned. The EU fully endorsed the principle by inserting a newArticle
46a into the 4th Company Law directive.9 Companies whose securities are admitted
8 Shleifer and Vishny (1997); see also, for one relatively recent empirical study, amongst many
in this area, Renders, Gaeremynck, and Sercu (2010).
9 Council Directive 78/660/EEC of 25 July 1978 based on Article 54 (3) (g) of the Treaty on the
annual accounts of certain types of companies [1978] OJ L222/11.
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to trading on a regulated market must include corporate governance statements in
their annual reports. In turn, these statements must include information with regard
to either the corporate governance code that the company has decided to abide by or
the code that the company applies or any other information regarding corporate
governance practices that go beyond the requirements of the national framework.
Moreover, in cases in which a company decides to depart from a corporate govern-
ance code, fully or partially, it must give explanations on the reasons for such a
decision. In the case of partial non-compliance, the company must clarify further
which respective sections of the code are not followed.
More recently, Directive 2013/30/EU requires listed companies to disclose
information with regard to certain corporate governance arrangements in their
corporate governance statements following the “comply or explain” principle,
according to the same framework provided by Directive 2006/46/EC.10
The “comply or explain” framework is extremely flexible and although it has not
caused corporate governance strategies to converge, precisely because – quite wisely
so – such a goal was never included in the EU or national regulatory agendas, it has
nevertheless met with considerable popularity amongst regulators and market parti-
cipants since it provides a commonly acceptable framework for the emergence of
various disclosure trends and information that are not hampered in their originality
and usefulness by the well-known rigidity of a hard law framework, identified with a
stringent “one-size-fits-all” approach that would seem unrealistic in corporate gov-
ernance (Kraakman et al., 2004). By knowing in advance that the principle allows a
corporate entity either to comply with soft law rules or to deviate and explain the
reasons for its “non-compliance”, a company has a much more convincing incentive
– at least in theory – to be substantially more open regarding its corporate govern-
ance system. This in turn allows the recipients of this information to understand in a
preferred way the company’s strategies and to evaluate it in a more informed and
sophisticated way. The particular attachment to increased investor awareness and
sophistication when it comes to evaluating the investee company is nothing new.
The ongoing expansion of disclosure trends for the benefit of investors at large
can be undoubtedly explained by the revival of ownership theories in listed compa-
nies (Biondi, 2012) and, more specifically, the “shareholder primacy” model in
corporate governance which, after having confronted and successfully dominated
the “stakeholder theory” and “enlightened shareholder value” (Keay, 2012; See also
Keay, 2009), focuses corporate managers’ attention exclusively on profit
10 Article 20(1) of Directive 2013/34/EU of the European Parliament and the Council of 26 June 2013
on the annual financial statements, consolidated financial statements and related reports of certain
types of undertakings, amending Directive 2006/43/EC of the European Parliament and of the
Council and repealing Council Directives 78/660/EEC and 83/349/EEC [2013] OJ L182/19.
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maximisation for the benefit of shareholders.11 Nowadays, the primary purpose of
publicly traded companies continues to be profit-oriented for the benefit of share-
holders,12 even if, as previously mentioned, listed companies should not only strive
to maximise profit for shareholders but also contribute to economic growth and
innovation, thus serving amultifunctional conceptual framework (Stout, 2013, p. 65).
Therefore, the centre of regulatory attention is inevitably channelled towards
the formation and expansion of a holistic disclosure trend, whose list of recipients
continues to include various market actors who interact with shareholders and are
involved, directly or indirectly, in investment decisions (Enriques & Gilotta, 2014,
pp. 4–7). It is thus expected that out of various disclosure statements, investors will
be better protected or, at least, feel much more immune against inappropriate
practices, developed either from corporate management or financial intermediaries
with whom they continue to interact on capital markets.
It was therefore no surprise that the “comply or explain” principle was broadly
accepted with regard to corporate governance statements and has confirmed its
status as one of the most important regulatory tools in an increasingly diverse
corporate landscape. By refocusing the debate on “shareholder primacy” in order to
convey the message at the EU and international level that shareholders count, are
efficiently protected and therefore securing their “confidence” to invest on a con-
stant basis, the current regulatory agenda further strengthens their powers by
acknowledging that they have rights to exercise and financial intermediaries
have, in their respect, responsibilities to assume. The epitome of this “shareholder”
regulatory focus is expressed via the assurance that all financial intermediaries
associated with shareholders need to be part of this disclosure trend and make
visible their practices as well as their overall methodologies.
Having become the “regulatory safety net” and the guarantee for the same
flexibility for all market actors involved in the investment chain, the “comply or
explain” principle keeps on being extensively used with regard to the exercise of
stewardship responsibilities by institutional investors to their clients, i.e. the
ultimate beneficiaries of the investment process.
2.2 Institutional investors’ statements
Institutional investors have recently come under the regulatory spotlight due to
their stewardship responsibilities, namely the duties bestowed upon the executive
11 See for example Berle (1932) and, for the revival of the “shareholder primacy” model in the
70s, Jensen and Meckling (1976).
12 For a series of very convincing arguments against the “shareholder primacy” theory, see
Stout (2012a). See also Stout (2012b).
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management of the investor group as well as on the asset managers in charge of
monitoring and developing their portfolios. According to one definition,
stewardship is responsible and thoughtful ownership. It is synonymous with an ownership
mindset and adopts a long-term perspective, but with a focus on value creation […] It is
also a mechanism to ensure the appropriate use of the power vested in institutions to
properly and effectively manage the funds, such as savings and pension contributions,
entrusted to them by the ultimate investors, the beneficiaries. (Foundation for Governance
Research and Education, 2011, p. 12)
There is no doubt that this stewardship trend is closely associatedwith the revival of
ownership views and, more generally, the “shareholder primacy” theory, as
explained above (Biondi, 2012, p. 4). Financial intermediaries are invited to show
at which point they can become good stewards on behalf of shareholders in order to
convey the message to the market at large that the centre of attention remains the
ultimate beneficiaries, who are therefore encouraged to continue to invest in capital
markets. Stewardship, if effectively implemented, therefore works as an additional
guarantee (at least in theory) that intermediaries will act in the best interests of their
clients and not in their own personal interests. The evolution and expansion of the
stewardship movement reminds us of the evolution of agency issues arising from
the separation of shareholding from control and management (Berle & Means,
1932), whereby directors had to ensure shareholders that they were acting in their
best interests instead of abusing their power and becoming entangled in agency
problems. It is therefore very interesting to see the evolution of this parallel con-
ceptual tendency for intermediaries to be encouraged to show the market that they
manage their clients’ assets effectively exactly because it is of vital importance for
the latter to maintain their confidence both in company directors and in financial
intermediaries with which their investment is entrusted.
The EU has not yet officially adopted any measures on stewardship although
this issue is included in its policy agenda. While not the only EU Member State
to have dealt with this issue,13 the UK moved towards adopting the UK
Stewardship Code in 2010. This Code contains a series of provisions to be used
by institutional investors. To date, it represents the most sophisticated approach
in Europe.14
13 See, for example, the Dutch best practices for engaged shareholding: http://www.eumedion.
nl/en/public/knowledgenetwork/best-practices/best_practices-engaged-share-ownership.pdf
accessed 15 March 2014.
14 After a consultation period, the UK Stewardship Code was revised in September 2012 and
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Without analysing in-depth all the implications emerging from the princi-
ples of the UK Stewardship Code, it would be useful to mention that institutional
investors are expected to disclose information on a series of issues, such as their
policies on how they discharge their responsibilities towards their clients, how
they manage potential conflicts of interest in the exercise of their duties, how
they monitor investee companies, how they exercise their voting powers and,
finally, they are expected to report periodically, or at least annually, to their
clients on their stewardship activities. The revised version of the Code further
developed a series of important issues for its recipients.15
It has set a target of increasing awareness of investment-related problematic
issues and is attempting to change the current short-term mentality in the
market16 in an extremely flexible way since, contrary to national corporate
governance codes as previously mentioned, institutional investors are not
15 The major contribution of the revised version is the enrichment of the guidance notes, as
well as an introductory section aimed at clarifying the notion of stewardship and the use of the
“comply or explain” principle in this context.
With regard to stewardship, a problematic area of the Code was – in its initial version – the
fact that it was not clarified in a way that would allow full understanding of the range of
responsibilities for all stakeholders. The Code now indicates that
[f]or investors, stewardship is more than just voting. Activities may include monitoring and
engaging with companies on matters such as strategy, performance, risk, capital structure,
and corporate governance, including culture and remuneration. Engagement is purposeful
dialogue with companies on these matters as well as on issues that are the immediate
subject of votes at general meetings. (Stewardship Code, 2012, p. 4)
Moreover, the initial text was not very detailed in terms of other market participants potentially
involved in the investment procedure and thus subject to the same stewardship responsibilities.
The phrasing of the initial version of the Code thus left room for improvement, and the current
revision of the Code seeks to satisfy this necessity by mentioning that “[t]he Code is directed in the
first instance to institutional investors, by which is meant asset owners and asset managers with
equity holdings in UK listed companies […] Accordingly, the Code also applies, by extension, to
service providers, such as proxy advisors and investment consultants”: (2012, p. 5).
Additionally, the duty to act in the client’s interests is not solely conceived with regard to
engagement and voting – which were mentioned in the initial version of the Code – but it is
generally required by institutional investors, enlarging the scope and application of this duty:
(2012, p. 6). Last but not least, the new version of the Code requires not just putting in place and
maintaining but also publicly disclosing the institutional investor’s policy for contending with
and managing all possible conflicts of interests: (2012, p. 6).
16 The short-term strategies and preferences have reached an alarming point where managers
had declared that they were willing to sacrifice the company’s prospective value in order to
satisfy those pressures from their clients (and their own remuneration schemes): Graham,
Harvey, and Rajgopal (2006).
Reconstruction of the “Comply or Explain” Principle 243
Unauthenticated
Download Date | 11/3/15 3:15 PM
required to follow the Code but are simply encouraged to become its signatories
and under that assumption are expected to disclose compliance with, or devia-
tion from, its recommendations. The reason for this increased flexibility in this
area is undoubtedly regulators’ desire to avoid, at least for the time being,
counter-productive intervention in the area of institutional shareholders. By
allowing a disclosure trend to emerge gradually via the encouragement of sign-
ing up the Code, it is expected that the increasing number of signatories will
participate in this trend, thus allowing the rest of the market to understand the
exercise of their activities. Although such an invitation might seem quite super-
ficial, looking back in 2010 when the Code was first introduced, we have to
consider it was the only possible regulatory approach that allowed, at that time,
this disclosure trend to expand to other countries and which prepared the field
for the European regulatory response that came recently with the proposal for a
Directive aimed at encouraging long-term shareholder engagement (this will be
discussed later in this paper).17
Therefore, the main objective of this stewardship trend is to give visibility
and awareness of the need for a viable, constant dialogue between company
management and institutional investors, which will hopefully generate a realis-
tic alignment of their respective incentives and targets. Even though critics of the
“shareholder democracy” and profit maximisation theory have wisely asserted
that the alignment of shareholders’ and corporate boards’ interests was already
expressed in short-term strategies (Aglietta & Rebérioux, 2005), the stewardship
trend claims, at least in theory, the usefulness of a much more engaged dialogue
which, by making shareholders much more aware of the complexities of the
whole investment chain, will allow a realignment of different agendas not
focused solely on short-term goals.
In fact, the Code refers to the concept of stewardship as something that “aims
to promote the long-term success of companies in such a way that the ultimate
providers of capital also prosper” (Stewardship Code, 2012a, p. 4). Stewardship
thus encompasses various activities for different actors involved in the investment
chain and invited by this regulatory tool, following the “comply or explain”
principle, to adhere to certain standards or to justify their non-compliance.
Acknowledging, as in the case of company profiles, that institutional inves-
tors have inevitably different strategies, conceptions and focuses with regard to
17 Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council amending Directive
2007/36/EC as regards the encouragement of long-term shareholder engagement and Directive
2013/34/EU as regards certain elements of the corporate governance statement, Brussels, 9 April
2014, COM(2014) 213 final, 2014/0121 (COD) http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/
PDF/?uri=CELEX:52014PC0213&from=EN accessed 15 May 2014.
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the exercise of their business activities, the “comply or explain” principle once
again found itself at the centre of attention and was considered to be the only
realistic tool to give the necessary flexibility to an ever-growing number of
financial intermediaries to disclose information on their activities. Again, it is
expected that out of this kind of flexible disclosure framework, their clients will
be in a position to evaluate them better and to make informed decisions when
choosing the investor group that will manage their capital.
Therefore, it comes as a plausible assumption that regulation continues to rely
on the “comply or explain” principle to make various activities much more visible
and subject to interaction and informed dialogue amongst market participants,
with the long-term objective of finding a common point of reference and alignment
between different objectives. Notwithstanding this regulatory framework’s “idea-
listic” purpose, which does not seem to fit perfectly with the prevailing short-term
mentality of institutional investors (Villiers, 2010, p. 287; see also Ambachtsheer,
Fuller, & Hindocha, 2013), encouraging market actors to interact, via the disclosure
of their practices, might be a first step at the EU level to refocusing the debate on
the necessity for “genuine” shareholder engagement, namely an engagement that
does not focus solely on short-term strategies and shows a less myopic conception
of the company’s long-term existence and continuity.
This view is not exempt from criticism and, more specifically, from the fact
that interaction between market participants may arguably be only the conse-
quence of long-term behaviour, not its cause. Indeed, it is difficult to assume that
because various parties have a flexible framework whereby they can interact and
evaluate one another, they will necessarily develop a constructive dialogue and
adopt collectively long-term objectives. Nevertheless, following this line of
interpretation, we risk relying upon the eventual scenario that participants
that are already long-term oriented will develop such a dialogue on their own.
This will marginalise all the beneficial outcomes that might result from educa-
tional purposes and the ongoing incentives to build dialogue between partici-
pants, acknowledging the different priorities of all parties involved but still
building together a conceptual framework towards long-term strategies and
objectives. Of course, under this ideological construction, speculative partici-
pants will never be part of the dialogue or may participate purely for “window-
dressing” purposes since they will still be seeking financial incentives to move
towards long-term strategies. But this should not prompt regulatory efforts
towards maintaining a distance from various parties and leaving such an impor-
tant issue exclusively to ad hoc initiatives. Dialogue should be generated in an
already educated and sophisticated environment. For the level of education in
capital markets to rise and for various parties to understand not only the
benefits that they may derive from investment practices but also their own
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responsibilities in the entire investment chain, as well as the ramifications of
their choices for other participants, the dialogue needs to occur upstream and
present a convincing case for a long-term vision. If the educational and pre-
ventive prerogatives are lost, the communication gap will persist only to be
bridged partially and periodically in cases where market participants with con-
siderable power, resources and sophistication are in a position to influence their
counterparties with regard to their long-term objectives.
The current EU agenda has included shareholder engagement as one of its
distinctive features by conveying the message that this is a topic that must be dealt
with at the EU level in the future. Apart from the publication of some recent informal
talks with interested parties,18 the European Commission had expressed its interest
in promoting this agenda since the Green Paper on corporate governance in
financial institutions and remuneration policies (Commission, 2013b) and the
Green Paper on EU corporate governance, which received wide support from its
respondents (Commission, 2011a). A muchmore decisive step was reached with the
EC Action Plan in 2012, which further clarified the need for much greater share-
holder engagement at the EU level with the announcement of an initiative, possibly
through modification of the Shareholder Rights Directive, that would deal with the
disclosure of voting and engagement policies, as well as voting records provided by
institutional investors (Commission, 2012). The crucial step was finally reachedwith
the proposal for a Directive to encourage long-term shareholder engagement and
certain elements of the corporate governance statement (Commission, 2014).
Aiming to increase transparency in financial intermediation, article 3f of the
proposal requires Member States to ensure that institutional investors and asset
managers will develop an “engagement policy” that will define grosso modo the way
they will exercise their activities with regard to the integration of shareholder
engagement into their strategy, the monitoring of and dialogue with investee com-
panies, the exercise of voting rights, the use of proxy advisory services and coopera-
tion with other shareholders.19 Most importantly, Section 3 of the same article
expects Member States to ensure that this engagement policy includes policies
that are purported to manage actual or potential conflicts of interest that may arise
in this framework, while providing a non-exhaustive conflict-of-interest list.20
18 The Commission engaged in informal discussions with stakeholders in early 2013:
Commission (2013a).
19 Ibid. Article 3f § 1, 19.
20 “Such policies shall in particular be developed for all of the following situations:
(a) the institutional investor or the asset manager, or other companies affiliated to them,
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Apart from developing an engagement policy, the proposal expects institu-
tional investors and asset managers to provide annual public disclosure of this
policy, the framework of its implementation and the consequent results.21 More
generally, when they decide not to develop an engagement policy or to disclose
its implementation and its results, institutional investors and asset managers are
expected, following the “comply or explain” principle, to give a clear and
reasoned explanation for this choice. The European Commission has justified
the use of the “comply or explain” principle in the proposal by advancing the
argument, similarly to other occasions in the past, that “Member States should
have a degree of flexibility as far as the transparency and information required
in this proposal are concerned, in particular in order to allow the norms to
adequately fit into the distinct corporate governance frameworks.”22
Indeed, it has to be borne in mind that shareholding structures across EU
Member States inevitably play a very important role in shaping corporate culture
as well as cooperating with institutional investor groups.23 Companies with dis-
persed shareholding tend to be more focused on short-term goals in order to
respond effectively to pressure from institutional investors. The same argument
cannot be used in family-owned companies, where the management board may
surely continue to focus on longer-term goals in order to ensure the continuity and
sustainable prosperity of the corporation. If this factor is taken into consideration,
then the monitoring of these companies by institutional investors as well as their
engagement strategies must vary to adapt themselves to national characteristics
and to be able to operate according to the respective corporate landscape.
It is therefore legitimate to argue that the presence of institutional investors
in various EU Member States will potentially become a driver for change of
corporate governance cultures via increasingly dispersed shareholding struc-
tures and the need for more “shareholder friendly” governance strategies.
Nevertheless, not having reached a completely harmonised framework on share-
holding structures across EU listed companies, we must admit that, at least in
the current phase, institutional investors cannot be expected to exercise their
(b) a director of the institutional investor or the asset manager is also a director of the
investee company;
(c) an asset manager managing the assets of an institution for occupational retirement
provision invests in a company that contributes to that institution;
(d) the institutional investor or asset manager is affiliated with a company for whose shares
a takeover bid has been launched.” Ibid. Article 3f § 2, 20.
21 Ibid. Article 3f § 3, 20.
22 Ibid. 7.
23 More generally on this topic, see Cheffins (2008).
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activities in the same way at the EU level since they interact with companies
operating in markets with various socio-economic and cultural idiosyncrasies.
Therefore, the European Commission does not currently view the develop-
ment of an EU Stewardship Code as a suitable or even realistic convergence
model. The proposal for a Directive sets the minimum standards expected by
institutional shareholders and asset managers to be ultimately formulated at the
national level, as seen above. It remains to be seen whether this approach is
preferred. Regardless of the potential efficiency of a future directive, the adoption
of an EU Stewardship Code should not be completely disregarded. Such a code
could broadly include the UK Stewardship Code’s provisions. Most importantly, it
is certain that, once again, the “comply or explain” principle would be called
upon for the task of boosting the visibility of the diversified business practices
amongst institutional investors24 and corporate boards25 in various EU Member
States, which will most probably continue to vary, functioning as a reflection of
the respective corporate governance cultures with which they interact.
24 In this regard, it should be noted that shareholding structures in the main EU capital markets,
affecting national corporate governance cultures and models indirectly, have changed dramatically
in the past decades. It is noteworthy that in Germany (a historically “concentrated ownershipmodel”
country) in 2012, 62% of the shares listed on the DAX index were held by institutional investors and
54% by foreign shareholders: Hopt (2013, p. 208). See also Roth (2013). Having been historically
associated with concentrated shareholding structures, German listed companies are beginning to
face the challenges for change in corporate culture to meet the expectations of predominantly
foreign institutional shareholders. Similar observations can be made about the UK capital market
where, according to the Office for National Statistics, foreign investors held in 2010 41.2% of the total
value of the UK stockmarket, showing a constant rise fromprevious years: ONS (2012). Nevertheless,
in other EU capital markets, for example France, where concentrated shareholding is the norm,
institutional investors play, at least for the time being, a less significant role since themonitoring and
engagement element is mainly exercised by a control shareholder or a group within the company
communicatingwith the corporate board. Nevertheless, it should be borne inmind that although the
concentration of capital still remains significant, there is a growing amount of participation by
foreign investors (42.3% in 2009 of the total market value of CAC 40 companies), which may act as a
driver for change in the future: Pietrancosta, Dubois, and Garçon (2013).
25 When dealing with regulatory measures in the area of corporate governance, it should be
borne in mind that different corporate governance models in Europe shape or inevitably
influence regulatory agendas at the national level. For example, although in the UK the
predominant feature of law has always been shareholder primacy, this view of the purpose of
the corporation is not unanimously shared in continental Europe, where the corporation model
is much more inclusive especially with regard to stakeholders. For example, the German model
has traditionally been conceived as adopting a more holistic approach by allowing employees
to actively participate in corporate governance systems. For an excellent analysis of various
national corporate governance models at the EU level, see Dine and Koutsias (2013).
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Regardless of the most suitable convergence regulatory tool in this area, it
remains to be seen whether the future Directive will effectively promote this
agenda and realistically strengthen the overall shareholder engagement trend.
2.3 Proxy advisor statements
The last area in which the “comply or explain” principle has been called into
action more recently is related to the activities of proxy advisors. Proxy advisory
firms are in charge of advising institutional investors and exercising the voting
rights of the latter, who most often delegate these powers to such firms in an
accelerating cost-saving framework.26 The ever-growing influence of proxy advi-
sors on institutional investors has triggered the need for the introduction of
disclosure obligations in order to provide the necessary information to existing
and potential clients on how they intend to exercise their activities and therefore
allow them, as well as other market participants and regulators, to better under-
stand their role and evaluate them in an adequate way.
In the Green Paper on corporate governance (Commission, 2011a, p. 14), the
European Commission mentioned the possibility of regulatory intervention in
this field, a statement that was recently followed by the proposal for a Directive
aimed at encouraging long-term shareholder engagement, as will be analysed
later in this paper (Commission, 2014). Feedback from stakeholders on the
appropriateness of such an agenda was very positive, showing a clear preference
for more transparency. The European Securities and Markets Authority (ESMA)
subsequently began its own consultation period with various stakeholders, and
in February 2013, published its Final Report (ESMA, 2013) on the results of the
consultation and planning the introduction of an EU Code of Conduct, prepared
by the Best Practice Principles Group (GBPP), an industry committee made up of
proxy advisory firm representatives (GBPP, 2014). As we can observe, the reg-
ulatory choice for a Code of Conduct and the preparation of the Best Practice
Principles for Shareholder Voting Research by an industry committee testify to
the need for maximum flexibility as this is the first approach for the introduction
of a disclosure framework at the EU level, with very few examples of similar
attempts in EU Member States.
26 Taking into consideration investors’ lack of expertise in deciphering complex corporate
decisions and their lack of funds for thorough research of companies’ profiles but, most
importantly, the constant pressure on many asset managers and institutional shareholder
groups to deliver short-term benefits to their clients, the need for proxy services has become
indisputable in the modern investment era: Rose (2007, p. 897).
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Before moving to the EU initiatives, it is necessary to draw some lessons from a
comparative analysis between the UK and French frameworks. This will make the
argument for more transparency at the EU level even more interesting since various
national frameworks currently in place provide different disclosure spectrums and
show the reason why the “comply or explain” principle needs to be maintained, at
least for the time being, in the proxy advisory industry’s disclosure obligations.
Therefore, by acknowledging and emphasising current divergent regulatory
approaches in the UK and France, our analysis will present a more convincing
argument for maintaining flexibility in this area. The argument for more flexibility
focuses mainly on the fact that proxy advisory firms have not been previously
subject to any disclosure obligations at the EU level, including some EU Member
States, and it would be only utopic to assume that a uniform and widely applicable
regulatory approach would bring substantial results in terms of transparency and
comparability between different practices experienced at the EU level. It is therefore
crucial for this initial period to contain a certain degree of flexibility, exemplified by
the “comply or explain” concept, so that we can then see how the overall disclosure
framework evolves in Europe before deciding to adoptmore stringentmeasures. This
argument becomes even timelier since the current EU regulatory policy adopts a
rather different solution, as will be explained later in this paper.
Thus proceeding with the comparative analysis of the UK and French frame-
works, it should be noted that the UK Stewardship Code, in its revised version
and as analysed above, included the proxy advisory industry in a general way in
its spectrum of application, thus expecting such firms to become voluntary
signatories and to abide by its principles (UK Stewardship Code, 2012a).
Conversely, the French competent authority (Autorité des Marchés Financiers,
hereinafter AMF) adopted in 2011 a recommendation that, although it does not
have binding force, takes a rather stricter approach than the UK one.
For example, acknowledging the risk of conflicts of interest when providing
various services, the AMF recommendation asks proxy advisory firms to mention
any possible ties to the company whose resolutions they are evaluating, to share-
holders who have proposed resolutions at the general meeting for which the proxy
advisors have provided a report for their clients, and lastly, to any persons who
might control directly or indirectly the public company ormajority shareholdings as
mentioned above (Autorité desMarchés Financiers (AMF) 2011). On the contrary, the
UK Stewardship Code contains a rather general obligation to publicly disclose the
robust policy on managing conflict of interest that its signatories should develop.
Moreover, with regard to engagement with investee companies, the UK
Stewardship Code leaves the signatory parties to determine the framework for
this type of engagement, while providing some very general recommendations.
Principle 6 of the Code states, for example, that “[i]nstitutional investors should
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disclose the use made, if any, of proxy voting or other voting advisory services.
They should describe the scope of such services, identify the providers and
disclose the extent to which they follow, rely upon or use recommendations
made by such services” (UK Stewardship Code, 2012a, p. 9). Nevertheless, the
AMF recommends that “the proxy advisor submit its draft report to the relevant
company for review, failing which the proxy advisor shall clearly state in its
analysis report that the draft was not submitted for review and explain the
reasons why” (AMF, 2011, p. 3). Moreover, under the condition that the com-
pany has informed the proxy advisory firm of its resolutions, the board’s
reports and any other documents, at least 35 days before the general meeting,
it has at least 24 hours to communicate any eventual remarks or comments. The
firm has to include in its analysis report, upon the company’s request, its
comments on its voting recommendations, under the condition that those
comments are precise, enlighten the shareholders on the draft resolutions
and do not discuss the general voting policy. If applicable, the firm corrects
any material mistakes detected in its analysis report and previously noted by
the company concerned and ensures disclosure to the investors as quickly as
possible (AMF, 2011, p. 3).
The comparative analysis aimed to show the different mentalities around the
level and quality of interventionism in the proxy advisory industry. The UK
Stewardship Code, following a much more flexible approach with very general
guidelines applicable to a broad series of market participants, creates a rather
acceptable framework for proxy advisory firms, leaving them the freedom to operate
in the market and disclose their practices accordingly. On the other hand, the
French recommendation – albeit not binding – aims to shape a much more
stringent framework which has not been unanimously accepted, taking into con-
sideration the criticism from some respondents to the ESMA report that this recom-
mendation has already created an unfavourable environment for some proxy
advisory firms in comparison with other legal advisors or non-European firms
(ESMA, 2013, p. 18). This probably shows that the industry is not yet ready, in its
entirety, to accept a stringent framework and instead prizes maximum operational
flexibility and the subsequent laxity of applicable rules. Different regulatory
approaches to shaping and suggesting a possible engagement with issuers make
it even more arduous to achieve a European consensus on this matter.
Therefore, going back to the EU dimension of the regulatory approach in
this area, it comes as no surprise that proxy advisory firms are not required to
follow the Best Practice Principles for Shareholder Voting Research but are
merely encouraged to become signatories, and under that assumption, are
expected to disclose compliance with (or deviation from) the Principles. Even
though this soft law tool might not currently be the ideal regulatory approach
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due to its extreme flexibility,27 ESMA has also mentioned that if this process
does not lead to satisfactory results or if market conditions create a need for
more regulatory intervention, it will proceed to adopt more formal measures.
Regardless of the prospective regulatory framework applicable to proxy advi-
sory firms, it is blatant that the “comply or explain” principle was the most obvious
choice to start encouraging firms to disclose information about their practices while
allowing them themaximum flexibility to deviate from the Principles recommended
by GBPP without facing public criticism about the lack of engagement or will-
ingness to participate in a soft law transparency framework. GBPP has therefore
issued three main Principles, accompanied by guidance notes recommending how
the Principles should be applied. The three Principles refer to the service quality
(provision of services delivered in accordance with agreed client specifications and
disclosure of research methodologies and, if applicable, “house” voting policies),
the management of conflicts of interest (disclosure of a related policy that details
the procedures for addressing potential or actual conflict of interest that may arise
with regard to the provision of proxy services) and, lastly, the communications
policy (disclosure of the policy for communication with issuers, shareholder pro-
ponents, other stakeholders, media and the public).
In their statements of compliance, proxy advisory firms should describe in a
meaningful way how they apply the Principles and related guidance, disclose
any specific information set out in the guidance, and where they do not comply
with either the Principles or the relevant information, they should provide a
reasoned explanation for their “non-compliance”.28
The most noteworthy issue, as far as the focus of this paper is concerned, is
that the “comply or explain” framework has been unanimously accepted by the
market participants in charge of this rulemaking initiative, due to its very flexible
nature and the legitimacy it gives “non-compliance” since the latter forms part of
the principle. It is therefore believed that, as we will show in the next part of this
paper, the principle is perfectly adaptable to any kind of regulatory framework
(binding Corporate Governance Codes for companies, non-binding Stewardship
Codes, non-binding Codes of Conduct for proxy advisors) precisely because it
legitimises both ideological stances, namely those of “compliance” and “non-
27 A slightly more stringent approach could indeed have been adopted to bring about much
more concrete disclosure results: Sergakis (2014).
28 Without going into further detail, we will nonetheless emphasise the very flexible nature
and vague wording of some crucial provisions of this Code of Conduct which, coupled with the
flexibility of the “comply or explain” principle, give substantial leeway to proxy advisory firms
to continue to determine the way in which they conduct their business without necessarily
avoiding some delicate issues for which they have been already criticised, the management of
conflicts of interest being the most notable. On this last issue, see Klöhn and Schwarz (2013).
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compliance” with a certain set of principles. Nevertheless, this ideological open-
ness with regard to the flexibility of the party responsible for disclosing its
practices also gives an equal degree of flexibility to treat the principle superficially,
knowing in advance that all possible positions will be legitimised by the “comply
or explain” concept.
On the other hand, as recently emphasised by the EC, “[t]he Commission
will consider an initiative in 2013, possibly in the context of the revision of the
Shareholders” Rights Directive, with a view to improving the transparency and
conflict-of-interest frameworks applicable to proxy advisors’ (Commission, 2012,
p. 11). Indeed, with the proposal for a Directive aimed at encouraging long-term
shareholder engagement and certain elements of the corporate governance
statement (Commission, 2014), the European Commission moved in a rather
surprising direction when it chose to require Member States to ensure that
proxy advisory firms publicly disclose a series of information on an annual
basis with regard to the preparation of their voting recommendations without
any recourse to the “comply or explain” principle.
More specifically, proxy advisors will have to disclose the main components of
the methodologies and models applied, the main information sources used, the
eventual consideration and its content of national market, legal and regulatory
conditions, the eventual dialogue developed with companies, the total number of
staff involved in the preparation of their voting recommendations, as well as the
total number of these recommendations provided in the year covered by the annual
disclosure.29 The proposal also provides that they should identify and disclose to
their clients and the company concerned by their recommendations any actual or
potential conflicts of interest that may exert an influence on their services, as well
as the actions that they have taken to eliminate or mitigate this type of conflict.30
The first impression from the proposal for a Directive is that it creates a rather
inconsistent framework with the EU Code of Conduct as previously analysed. This
is due to the fact that, while very flexible, the Code of Conduct covers a consider-
able range of issues that, if combined with the related guidance, gives the market
the chance to receive a considerable amount of information on proxy advisory
firms. On the contrary, the European Commission seems to have opted for a much
narrower focus of attention but without the flexibility of the “comply or explain”
principle. This can possibly be explained by the need to convey the message that
an absolute minimum “informational safety net” is guaranteed without recourse
to a flexible disclosure framework but with more binding disclosure requirements.
In this respect, the proposal mentions that “proxy advisors will only be subject to
29 Ibid. Article 3i § 2, 22.
30 Ibid. Article 3i § 3, 22.
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some basic principles to ensure accuracy and reliability of their recommenda-
tions.”31 It therefore seems that the preference was clearly for a minimum of issues
to be disclosed in a binding framework and thus without the risk of associating
them with perfunctory explanations in case of deviation.
At the further level of analysis, it is rather unfortunate that the proposal
chooses a rather different direction from that of the EU Code of Conduct at almost
the same period. Would it not have been preferable to coordinate private and
public efforts to shape an initial regulatory framework for proxy advisory firms in
order to avoid further confusion and inconsistencies between different sources of
rulemaking both at the national and at the EU levels? The main concern about the
current proposal is that, by leaving it to Member States to require proxy advisors to
disclose information on a specific series of issues, national frameworks will inevi-
tably move towards this informational minimum without necessarily making the
effort to trigger further reforms and create a more sophisticated and elaborate
informational spectrum for the benefit of the rest of the market. At the same time,
the Best Practice Principles for Shareholder Voting Research issued by GBPP will
continue to exist at the EU level as a private-sector initiative and as a non-binding
document that invites proxy advisory firms to become signatories and follow its
more detailed principles while benefiting from the “comply or explain” framework.
The rather unfortunate result will therefore be that proxy advisory firms will be
required to follow a minimum of binding disclosure requirements at the national
level, while maintaining the discretion to adhere to (and probably not sufficiently
engage with) a broader non-binding set of principles at the EU level. The main
concern about this inconsistency is that it will become rather burdensome for the
rest of the market to understand the information disclosed according to the pro-
spective regulatory framework at both the national and EU levels. Moreover, it is
rather unfortunate that the proposal for a Directive does not require proxy advisors
to publicly disclose actual or potential conflicts of interest, but only to disclose them
to their clients and the company concerned by their recommendations, whereas the
EU Code of Conduct clearly favours public disclosure in this area. Although it is
rather premature to predict the outcomes of these different regulatory initiatives,
the EU agenda needs to take into serious consideration potential sources of infor-
mational inconsistency and confusion that will make the overall disclosure exercise
somewhat burdensome and of little use to market participants.32
31 Ibid. 7.
32 See also the arguments advanced by the European Commission with regard to the option of
binding transparency requirements in combination with the EU Code of Conduct and in
comparison with the other three possible options (no policy change/recommendation on dis-
closure requirements/detailed regulatory framework): Commission (2014, pp. 62–64).
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2.4 “One concept fits all”?
Having analysed the “comply or explain” principle across different areas of activity,
namely the ones of listed companies, institutional investors in proxy advisors,
aiming to show the growing trend in the use of the principle, one question inevi-
tably arises: can we realistically expect the same informational outcome and rate of
compliance or deviation from all the above-mentioned regulatees? The principle
itself emerged as an alternative to the rigidity of the “one-size-fits-all” concept that
seems unpractical in corporate governance and, although still being used across
these sectors, it becomes crucial to distinguish between the various activities of
regulatees and to show whether “one concept fits all”.
Listed companies rely, amongst other things, on a continuous flow of invest-
ment. Their shareholders are a decisive factor for their future, providing the capital
for company operations and expansion opportunities. Also bearing in mind that
shareholders are at risk of losing only their investment, with no other implications
for their personal assets, the relationship that they build with an investee company
is based exclusively on a common profit-making goal without any element of a
“client – service provider” relationship. This observation leads us undoubtedly to
the conclusion that companies should feel relatively free to use both parts of the
“comply or explain” principle fully, because although there is an expectation from
the investor community for their portfolio to generate profits, the means used to
ensure their strategies’ success cannot be clearly identified and confined into a
strictly contractual obligation to provide services in a predetermined way, as
institutional investors or proxy advisors would do with their clients.
Turning our attention to institutional investors or proxy advisors, the situa-
tion might be interpreted slightly differently since they provide management
services to their clients, and these services are specified contractually. Therefore,
it could be argued that the expectations of the recipients of information dis-
closed could be slightly greater with regard to the use of the “comply or explain”
principle in both instances, namely they could expect either a higher rate of
compliance or much more detailed explanations in the case of deviation.
Moreover, it could be also argued that due to the presence of a “client – service
provider” relationship, institutional investors and proxy advisors should feel
less free to deviate from best practices not just because this would trigger further
complaints from their existing clients but also because this could severely affect
their reputation and attractiveness in the eyes of future clients.
On the other hand, the same situation could be interpreted inversely,
namely that service providers, as long as they meet their contractual engage-
ments to clients, should feel freer not to follow best practices if the current
methods and operating strategies applied meet their clients’ expectations, even
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though they consist of alternative ways of doing business that do not coincide
with the best practices included in a soft law code. Nevertheless, this latter
opinion should be validated with reservation, since compliance with a set of best
practices is not intended for existing clients alone but should, in the eyes of the
regulator and the investor community, take into consideration wider implica-
tions and needs of future clients and stakeholders. This means that service
providers should go beyond their contractual arrangements with their existing
clients and strive to increase their reputation via the disclosure of useful infor-
mation while containing commonly acceptable standards or, at least, providing
a truly meaningful explanation when they choose not to do so.
The exact repercussions of deviation for all the aforementioned regulatees
cannot be predicted with certainty because they interact with various parties and
in different situations. As we will show later in the paper, the recipients of the
information disclosed tend to prefer a “box ticking” approach to formal compliance
instead of an in-depth analysis of a meaningful explanation provided in the case of
deviation. Regulatees are therefore constantly under pressure to comply with the
principles and to avoid the “non-compliance” scenario, and this inevitably prevents
the “comply or explain” principle from fully exploiting its different forms and fields
of communication with other parties. These should nevertheless not mean that “one
concept fits all” since, as was shown, expectations and pragmatic considerations
may differ according to the relationship between providers and recipients of the
information disclosed. Hence both parts of the principle should be equally accep-
table by its users, irrespective of the nature and source of the information. For such
an objective to bemet, further analysis is needed on how all parties use the principle
and perceive the content of disclosure. After having analysed the three main
regulatory fields in which the principle has been put into practice, we will thus
need to “deconstruct” this ideological concept and show the veritable merits but,
most importantly, the dangers arising from its superficial conception and use by
market participants which will inevitably weaken it in the future unless a consensus
can be reached on its role and usefulness.
3 The deconstruction of the “comply or explain”
principle
3.1 Flexibility of the “comply or explain” principle
As previously mentioned, the “comply or explain” principle offers maximum
flexibility to extremely diverse fields of activity, incentives and strategies.
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Various market actors’ unique idiosyncrasies cannot be channelled to a spe-
cific pattern and cannot be predictable in capital markets, where moral hazard,
market manipulation and limited knowledge (along with ignorance) reach
their apogee.33 Therefore, the principle acknowledges the inherent deficiencies
of every regulatory approach that would opt for a unanimously applicable
framework without any possible derogation or flexibility. Our examination of
the principle’s application to the areas of listed companies, institutional share-
holders and proxy advisors, as developed in Part 1, shows that the common
denominator is the extreme diversity of different market participants within a
single sector, their difference in size or experience, or, taking the debate to the
national, EU or international levels, their culture about how their activities
should be thought of and carried out. It is exactly this difficulty in producing
rules and expecting an extremely diverse business community to apply them in
the same way that initially made the “comply or explain” concept so suitable
to acknowledge, accept and legitimise the preservation of individual charac-
teristics, under the condition that the party that does not comply, fully or
partially, with a set of rules must explain the reasons for this choice.
Moreover, acknowledging this diversity, it has always been in the regula-
tors’ best interests to develop a framework that encourages transparency
without imposing stringent obligations. The prevalence of “principles-based”
standards and soft law measures has fitted elegantly with the need to ensure
this kind of regulatory flexibility and has undoubtedly been appreciated by
the business community. In fact, the idea that the initial recourse to soft law
measures was somewhat “biased”, aiming to preserve and accommodate
business needs instead of encouraging companies to come forward in a
more efficient way, cannot be entirely excluded from our debate. Therefore,
quite legitimately so, the defenders of “hard law” measures continue to
consider corporate governance in particular to be a legitimate area for much
more intrusive regulation of companies’ lives.34 The criticism of the laxity of
soft law measures and parties’ considerable leeway to avoid greater transpar-
ency vis-à-vis the recipients of the information disclosed can be especially
formulated with regard to the stewardship movement and the best principles
for proxy advisors. Nevertheless, stewardship trends have only recently
emerged and therefore there could still be an optimistic perspective that soft
law will be sufficiently convincing in allowing parties to increase
33 See for example Biondi (2011).
34 For a discussion on the debate “soft law v. hard law” as far as companies are concerned, see
Aguilera, Goyer, and Kabbach-Castro (2013, pp. 22–28). See also the very interesting study of
MacNeil and Li (2006).
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transparency on their activities and engage in a more fruitful way with other
market actors. As the FRC wisely stated, “[t]he Stewardship Code, unlike the
UK Corporate Governance Code, is still in its infancy and behavioural change
will take time” (FRC, 2013, p. 4).
More generally, the criticism levelled against soft law measures, especially
the “comply or explain” principle, is that the parties use it fairly superficially,
and therefore the chance for more transparency and better communication is
severely compromised.
3.2 Users’ superficial conception of the principle
3.2.1 Information providers
Starting chronologically from 1992 when the “comply or explain” concept was
formally introduced in the UK corporate governance landscape, it was hoped that
companies would take full advantage of the principle, and information recipients
would have the chance to gain a sufficient understanding of corporate strategies
and build a more fruitful relationship with investee companies. Nevertheless, even
in the UK framework where the principle has been present for more than 20 years,
serious problems persist with regard to its conception, its use and its treatment by
all concerned parties. Moreover, since the adoption of the principle at the EU level
with Directive 2006/46/EC, it was expected that companies in other EU Member
States would sooner or later adhere to this philosophy while maintaining their
idiosyncrasies. The rather disappointing outcome observed arises from the fact that
both aspects of the principle suffer from poor-quality engagement.
As far as the “comply” part of the principle is concerned, it is rather
frustrating to see that the perception of the level of compliance35 as well as
the level of full compliance36 varies significantly from one European country to
the next. This observation does not necessarily mean that non-compliant reg-
ulatees reject the principle in general nor that the principle lacks an effective
mechanism to orientate companies towards a certain ideological stance in
35 A distinction needs to be drawn between formal or mere compliance and real compliance.
The former refers to a simple declaration that a company has complied with the provision that
may not necessarily mean that a company has also satisfied the underlying reasoning of the
provision itself but has just declared compliance to satisfy the market’s need for a good
compliance rate. The latter denotes a genuine compliance attitude, not only with the provision
itself but, most importantly, with its underlying justifications.
36 Compliance with the full number of soft law provisions.
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accordance with best practices. We must bear in mind that “non-compliance” is
legitimised through the explanatory part of the principle and should be perfectly
acceptable. Moreover, in theory, “non-compliance” makes the principle more
useful for regulatory purposes since it conveys important messages for the
adaptability of the applicable provisions and the needs of regulatees.
Nevertheless, our main concern is that the variable rate of compliance is not
accompanied with meaningful explanations and therefore the overall effective-
ness of the “comply or explain” mechanism becomes problematic.
Starting with the “comply” part of the principle, in some countries, such as
the UK, overall compliance is believed to be rather satisfactory and highly praised,
serving (at least for the UK market) as a legitimate justification for continuing with
soft law measures. According to the latest UK annual review (Thornton, 2013),
57% of companies reported full compliance with the Corporate Governance Code,
and the remaining 43% (which declared non-compliance) had difficulty in com-
plying with very few provisions of the Code. This of course does not necessarily
mean that real compliance with soft law provisions is achieved since, as pre-
viously mentioned, companies may be just pushed to declare formal compliance
without actually showing genuine engagement with the purpose of applicable
provisions. Nevertheless, this kind of percentage gives the market the impression
that the code is efficient since most of its provisions are respected by companies.
On the other hand, in continental Europe – where the “comply or explain”
principle continues to be applied but in a rather less straightforward or
ill-understood way37 due to cultural differences and different corporate governance
models – the compliance rate seems to convey rather mixed messages. For
example, in Germany, the percentage of full compliance with all provisions of
the code is not entirely satisfactory if we take into account that the compliance rate
for the DAX 30 companies for most of the provisions is higher than 90% but not for
all of them (Roth, 2013, p. 353). Moreover, smaller firms tend to show much lower
compliance rates in general (Roth, 2013, p. 353). Therefore, even if the majority of
the provisions continue to be followed by most DAX 30 companies, the level of full
compliance with the whole array of provisions is not satisfactory and the same
observation needs to be put forward with regard to smaller firms that struggle to
37 It should be borne in mind that the principle itself was designed initially for the UK market
and the flexibility given to the providers of information was crucial to the viability and vibrant
character of the City. Transposing the principle and its flexibility in continental Europe was
therefore bound to face (and continue to fuel) certain cultural obstacles since CEOs from other
countries still consider the principle to be a futile exercise and they are not entirely convinced
of the merits that it brings into companies’ lives. See, for example, the very interesting empirical
data, with regard to UK and German CEOs, gathered by Sanderson et al. (2013).
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comply at a satisfactory percentage with soft law provisions. Therefore, the prin-
ciple itself inevitably becomes partially unconvincing and receives a considerable
amount of criticism.38 For example, in a very interesting empirical comparative
study of corporate governance statements in the UK and Germany, it is fairly
obvious that German companies are still struggling with the “comply or explain”
itself, since the number of deviations is much greater than in the UK and the
explanations provided are not always satisfactory.39
As mentioned above, a high rate of deviation is not alarming per se since the
principle encompasses and legitimises both ideological stances. Instead, it is a
combination of a low compliance rate with poor quality of the explanations provided
that makes the overall mechanism of the “comply or explain” principle problematic
and triggers further considerations for possible reforms. As far as the “explain” part
of the principle is concerned, if companies do not provide any or sufficient explana-
tion with regard to their choices, recipients are unable to understand the underlying
reasons why commonly acceptable rules are not followed. Perfunctory explanations
create a further gap in communication amongst market disciplines as it clearly
shows a lack of engagement and an unwillingness to become more transparent. In
fact, the same report states that companies have, in their majority, ignored the FRC’s
latest recommendations regarding the provision of meaningful explanation in case
of “non-compliance” (FRC, 2012b).
Indeed, the FRC began in 2012 a consultation process in that respect, after
having met with senior investors and companies in December 2011 to discuss the
notion of “meaningful explanation”. The results of those meetings were
38 See, for example, the intense debate in Germany in 2010 around the efficiency of the
principle itself, questioning soft law measures. The Report was drafted by a Government
Commission on the German Corporate Governance Code: Bericht der Regierungskommission
Deutscher Corporate Governance Kodex an die Bundesregierung (2010) http://zip-online.de/
volltext.html?id=2a38a4a9316c49e5a833517c45d31070 accessed 9 November 2014.
39 Sanderson, Seidl, and Roberts (2012). Even if these data may imply that the most important
issue is the lack of meaningful explanations and not the poor rate of compliance in itself, it
seems rather complex to decipher the inner motivations of “non-compliance”. Could for
example “non-compliance” be seen as the natural outcome of a different and perfectly legit-
imate company profile that justifies the rejection of a set of best practices? Or could it be
interpreted as a general aversion to “mainstream” suggestions and the “comply or explain”
principle in general? This observation is particularly relevant in countries where corporate
culture is very different from the one present in the UK. Interviews conducted in the above-
mentioned comparative study show that many German CEOs do not actually understand the
principle and that they feel that they have to abide by a system that is not always meaningful.
Hence, it would be plausible to assume that, unless new empirical evidence emerges in the
future on the inherent motivations for “non-compliance”, there can be no certainty on the
underlying justifications of this ideological stance adopted by the users of the principle.
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published in February 2012 and the FRC issued three criteria that could be a
model to inspire similar activities undertaken with the business sector under the
purview of other national authorities: firstly, the explanation should provide the
context and historical background; secondly, it should provide a convincing
argument for the solution adopted by the company and further analyse any
potential moderating actions that the company has taken to solve any eventual
additional risks and to ensure a certain level of compliance with the code’s
provisions; thirdly, the company should explain whether the deviation was
limited in time and when it intends to resume compliance with the code’s
provisions.
The overall impression is clearly that there is still a lot of room for improve-
ment in disclosing meaningful explanations. In annual reviews of other EU
Member States,40 the results regarding meaningful explanations are much
more disappointing, clearly showing a tendency not to engage in honest expo-
sure when deviating from the Code.41 More recently, the European Commission
issued a Recommendation on this issue, predominantly applicable to listed
companies following article 20 (1) of Directive 2013/34/EU,42 by emphasising
the need for high-quality reporting in the cases of both formal compliance and
non-compliance, namely departure from the provisions of corporate governance
codes.43
First of all, the Recommendation encourages listed companies to describe
how they have applied the soft law provisions on the topics of major impor-
tance for shareholders, following the framework of article 20 (1). Companies
need to satisfy the criteria of clarity, accuracy and comprehensibility while
referring to their particular idiosyncrasies to enable shareholders, investors
and stakeholders to gain sufficient understanding of their corporate govern-
ance system.44
Secondly, in cases of non-compliance,
40 For example, Belgium and Germany, only to name a few. For Germany, see the very
interesting empirical data from Sanderson et al. (2012, pp. 1–36).
41 For example, according to the latest French review of corporate governance statements, the
AMF observed that 19 out of 25 companies that summarised deviations from the Afep–Medef
Code in a single paragraph/table did not present an exhaustive table and omitted certain
deviations from the Code, especially with regard to remuneration issues. Moreover, only six
of these companies provided complete information on deviations with regard to remuneration
issues: AMF (2013, pp. 76–77).
42 Commission (2013) (n 10).
43 Commission Recommendation of 9 April 2014 on the quality of corporate governance
reporting (“comply or explain”) [2014] OJ L109/43.
44 Ibid. Section II, 46.
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companies should clearly state which specific recommendations they have departed from
and, for each departure from an individual recommendation: (a) explain in what manner
the company has departed from a recommendation; (b) describe the reasons for the
departure; (c) describe how the decision to depart from the recommendation was taken
within the company; (d) where the departure is limited in time, explain when the company
envisages complying with a particular recommendation; (e) where applicable, describe the
measure taken instead of compliance and explain how that measure achieves the under-
lying objective of the specific recommendation or of the code as a whole, or clarify how it
contributes to good corporate governance of the company.45
It is hoped that this initiative will gradually contribute to the convergence of
reporting practices across EU Member States, but it is doubtful that such a
goal can be achieved via a simple recommendation. A much more convin-
cing approach would have been to incorporate these provisions into the
relevant Directives (mentioned above), to accelerate convergence in this
area. Requiring companies via a Directive to clarify further their own idio-
syncrasies to better inform the market of the underlying reasons for their
compliance or departure from certain provisions, as well as to provide
meaningful explanations when they do depart from a code, would have
inevitably brought much more concrete results in the near future. Although
the counterarguments for flexibility could be advanced in this scenario, we
firmly believe that the “comply or explain” principle offers enough flexibility
to companies when they do not follow certain provisions, and it would
therefore have been a legitimate compromise to require them to provide
meaningful explanations via a Directive.
The current Recommendation testifies to the increasing influence of companies
on regulatory initiatives. The situation becomes even more preoccupying if we bear
in mind that while it is clear, from a strictly legal point of view, that any violation of
the “comply or explain” principle can trigger sanctions, companies continue to
avoid fully respecting the framework and national authorities seem reluctant to
impose sanctions. Indeed, it is rather difficult to impose sanctions, especially for
non-respect of the explanatory part of the principle, since its subjective character –
dependent on the individual circumstances of each company – can become a
convincing defence argument in the face of alleged inconsistency or disclosure of
inaccurate information, especially in the absence of proof. Moreover, a causal link
between deficient quality of the explanatory part and a loss suffered as a result of
this situation could be even more difficult to demonstrate.
Examining the respect of the principle under the “institutional shareholders”
perspective and the disclosure of information with regard to the exercise of their
45 Ibid. Section III, 46.
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activities under the UK Stewardship Code, the results seem equally frustrating.
Indeed, according to the latest review conducted by the FRC (2013), half of the
signatories have not even updated their compliance statements since the latest
reform of the Code in 2012 that introduced more soft law principles. Therefore,
even if they comply formally with the Code, this kind of compliance remains super-
ficial due to its pure formality and its lack of substance since it only refers to and
reflects the partial spectrum of the Code as contained in its initial 2010 version.
Moreover, those that have updated their compliance statements provide poor-quality
information, especiallywith regard to themanagement of conflicts of interest and the
collective engagement issuesprescribed in the Code. Although adherence to the Code
is purely voluntary, the signatories do not sufficiently engage with the Code and the
“comply or explain” principle itself. The same concerns could be shared with regard
to the newly established framework for proxy advisors, as previously described,
whose purely voluntary adoption might create deficiencies in the quality of engage-
ment fromproxy advisory firms andmight risk severely weakening the importance of
the “comply or explain” principle if its conception and use remains superficial.
Therefore, more research will be needed in the near future after the first series of
publication of proxy advisory compliance statements to these principles occurs.
As an initial general assessment of the quality of engagement by the information
providers, it seems that they have conceived of soft law measures as an effective
excuse for avoiding a genuinely transparent mentality on how they conduct their
business and how they are willing to engage with other participants. Although this
argument could be extended to claim that soft law measures have been initially
conceived and applied to accommodate business needs and are therefore not
essentially purported to serve as a convincing regulatory tool for the introduction
of an informational transparent framework, we firmly believe that the essential
problem lies with the use of soft law measures and not with their identity as such.
Flexibilitymight have been one of the drivers for change and the adoption of soft law
measures, but it can certainly not be transformed into an “illusionmaking”mechan-
ism if the provider of the information is willing to engage effectively in this frame-
work. It is therefore not the “softness” of the legal framework as such that is
problematic, but the fact that market participants continue to rely upon flexibility
to avoid better informing the rest of the market.
3.2.2 Information recipients
As far as investors are concerned, despite their interest in these statements, they
seem not to fully appreciate the principle itself since they interpret both the
compliance and explanatory parts of the principle rather mechanistically.
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Investors do not always react predictably since they are much more concerned
about the financial performance of a company rather than compliance or expla-
natory issues regarding a specific set of rules Arcot, Bruno, Faure Grimaud
(2010). The corporate short-termism and lack of “genuine” engagement with
boards46 has led shareholders to be much more concerned about profits and the
management of their portfolios by financial intermediaries than whether the
company has made a real effort either to comply with the recommendations of a
corporate governance code or to explain in a detailed and substantial way its
distinctive features that justify deviation from the code.47 This conception of the
usefulness of corporate governance statements inevitably creates an almost
automatic preference for “mere compliance” statements in order to ensure that
the investee company follows a certain set of recommendations and broadly
acceptable principles, without therefore concentrating on the actual compliance
and the subsequent adoption of corporate governance practices that show that
they are adopted to serve the underlying purpose.
What is even more alarming is that investors tend to start paying atten-
tion to compliance or non-compliance issues only when corporate decisions
create losses. In other words, as long as the corporate culture adopted proves
to be profitable for their investment, they tend to be indifferent even in cases
where a non-compliant company does not provide sufficient explanation for
its deviation from a code.48 The same concern could be expressed with
regard to the disclosure of information relevant to the exercise of stewardship
responsibilities by institutional investors since their clients will most likely be
indifferent to a “non-compliance” statement if their portfolio remains profit-
able. Nevertheless, it has to be borne in mind that empirical studies with
regard to the perception of stewardship statements by investors have not yet
been published due to the very recent introduction of the UK Stewardship
46 Namely an engagement that perceives the company as a vehicle for long-term investment
and performance and not as a short-term profit mechanism as it has been seen in the recent
financial crisis where institutional shareholders and corporate boards were perfectly aligned
in that respect. It should also be borne in mind that our study is not focused on the
relationship between short-termism and liquidity-provision driven strategies. Indeed, the
latter may have a legitimate justification, namely in the case of capital raising needs.
Moreover, it should be acknowledged that when liquidity is provided for speculative reasons,
these strategies may reinforce pro-cyclical waves that will inevitably hamper the stability of
financial markets.
47 This is inevitably due, amongst other factors, to the gradual dissociation of shareholders
from the management of corporate affairs. On the general issue of the separation of share-
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Code. It will therefore be a very interesting field of research to observe a
possibly similar approach from individual investors towards statements aris-
ing from institutional shareholders or proxy advisors, as they have been
previously analysed.
Having “deconstructed” the “comply or explain” principle by showing its
merits and shortfalls, this paper aims now to “reconstruct” the principle and
provide for pragmatic solutions to restore its convincing force and efficiency for
its users.
4 The reconstruction of the “comply or explain”
principle
4.1 The reinforcement of an engaged interaction between
different market actors
Having emphasised the superficial conception and use of the “comply or
explain” framework of both information providers and recipients, it is vital to
begin any proposal by reconsidering the quality of engagement in the relation-
ships built between market participants. Proven to be a very flexible disclosure
tool for corporate governance statements, stewardship statements and proxy
advisory statements, the “comply or explain” framework is ideally positioned
to coordinate a nexus of potentially fruitful and interactive relationships with
one common denominator: all parties that follow the principle, participate in the
investment chain and should all be interested in evaluating and being evaluated
by other market participants while respecting with the same rigour, flexibility
and openness offered by this principle.
If companies, institutional investors and proxy advisors follow the principle
with the same mindset, the engagement conundrum might be more realistically
resolved since all parties involved in the investment chain will accept a priori
that they have an equal chance to declare compliance with a set of rules or non-
compliance associated with meaningful explanations. Under this assumption,
all parties should equally value both ideological stances and the chances of
rejecting a “non-compliance” statement will lessen.
As an overall impression, although the adoption of the “comply or
explain” principle at the EU level has clear potential to better connect
corporate boards with shareholders and stakeholders who may be affected
by companies’ activities, via the provision of a series of information that can
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give rise to fruitful discussions and mutual understanding of business prio-
rities, it has not yet been perceived as a realistic path of exposure and
communication by both companies and investors. A consistent deficiency in
the quality of the explanations provided, in a non-compliance scenario, will
not only jeopardise the information provided to investors but, most impor-
tantly, will damage the principle itself and weaken its foundations. As has
been wisely stated, “failure to provide an adequate explanation increases the
risk not only of the company being perceived as acting illegitimately but also
of the code being seen as lacking legitimacy” (Sanderson, Seidl, & Roberts,
2013, p. 6).
In order to overcome superficial and merely technical behaviour around the
use of corporate governance statements, both companies and investors should
start disconnecting their decision-making processes from short-term benefits
that seem to be the source of this problematic situation. It would be useful to
remember that corporate boards are under constant pressure to deliver results
not just according to their own possible short-term targets but, most impor-
tantly, the targets fixed by their shareholders, which may demand an even more
aggressive decision-making strategy. The preference for an aggressive strategy,
which might well go against the company’s long-term performance, is justified
in theory by the pressing need of corporate boards to satisfy the “dependence of
markets on constant company-relevant data streams as a basis for stock alloca-
tion decisions and associated professional communications. This in turn creates
a compelling pressure on corporate managers to generate fresh ‘news’ indicative
of perceived business ‘progress’, in an effort to influence future share price
movements.”49 This general trend towards a short-term informational and opera-
tional focus, accentuated with a burdensome and ever-growing corporate report-
ing framework, does not allow much space for optimism with regard to the
change of corporate culture and the reorientation of targets towards long-term
objectives. Markets need constant confirmation of an optimistic corporate sce-
nario in order to justify their investment decisions and reassure investors of the
“rationality” of their short-term objectives. This cultural phenomenon is
obviously unsustainable, for both companies and investors, since it draws the
attention of market participants away from the need for business innovation and
growth, and focuses predominantly on the illusionary shaping of optimistic
news that is reflected in share price movements.
Corporate greed has of course been observed and severely criticised in the
wake of various corporate and financial scandals, and it is very difficult to




Download Date | 11/3/15 3:15 PM
predict with certainty whether directors would reorient their strategies as soon
as investor pressure for short-term returns would disappear (Weinstein, 2013,
p. 54). But it would be at best illusionary to isolate management short-termism
from the identical trend arising from the “bottom”, namely the investor commu-
nity, for the reasons explained above. Moreover, financial intermediaries have
long reproduced and enhanced the short-term investment trend due to the fact
that their evaluation is based on short-term performance and the additional
development of good stewardship activities on behalf of their clients is mostly
irrelevant, hence the lack of incentive for engagement with companies (Wong,
2010, p. 409). Their evaluation is correlated with a market-based notion of
performance, mainly driven by capital market gains and speculative trading,
and is therefore detached from a stewardship culture. The recent proposal for a
Directive aimed at encouraging long-term shareholder engagement, as pre-
viously analysed, contains further provisions that aim to increase the transpar-
ency of the investment strategy followed by institutional investors, as well as
their arrangements with asset managers.50 The provisions are surprisingly
50 Article 3g of the proposal requires Member States to ensure that institutional investors
publicly disclose how their investment strategy is aligned with the profile and duration of
their liabilities, as well as how it contributes to the performance of their assets on a medium to
long-term basis. Institutional investors are also required to publicly disclose any arrangements
that they may have with asset managers with regard to:
(a) whether and to what extent it incentivises the asset manager to align its investment
strategy and decisions with the profile and duration of its liabilities; (b) whether and to what
extent it incentivises the asset manager to make investment decisions based on medium to
long-term company performance, including non-financial performance, and to engage with
companies as a means of improving company performance to deliver investment returns; (c)
the method and time horizon of the evaluation of the asset manager’s performance, and in
particular whether, and how this evaluation takes long-term absolute performance into
account as opposed to performance relative to a benchmark index or other asset managers
pursuing similar investment strategies; (d) how the structure of the consideration for the
asset management services contributes to the alignment of the investment decisions of the
asset manager with the profile and duration of the liabilities of the institutional investor; (e)
the targeted portfolio turnover or turnover range, the method used for the turnover calcula-
tion, and whether any procedure is established when this is exceeded by the asset manager;
(f) the duration of the arrangement with the asset manager. (Commission, 2014, pp. 20–21)
Article 3h also includes provisions applicable to asset managers who are required to disclose on
a half-yearly basis to the institutional investor with which they may have an arrangement, as
analysed above, how their own investment strategy complies with that arrangement and how it
contributes to the medium to long-term performance of the institutional investor’s assets:
Commission (2014, p. 21).
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detailed for such an issue, which has for a very long time remained mostly a
private matter between various financial intermediaries, and they are purported
to engage institutional investors and asset managers in a disclosure exercise to
the rest of the market to explain inter alia how their actions contribute to the
medium to long-term performance of the assets invested.
It is therefore hoped that, if followed as expected, this type of disclosure will
help both intermediaries and the rest of the market to obtain a common under-
standing of their respective activities and the contribution of the latter towards a
different, namely more sustainable, investment mentality.51 As previously men-
tioned, the merits and shortfalls of disclosure are inevitably unpredictable as the
information provided can be used as a beneficial means of communication and
interaction or as a profitable tool for speculative purposes. Encouraging market
participants to expose their strategies and operating methods will inevitably be a
very difficult and delicate task that may need much time before becoming a
convincing argument and being seen as the only viable solution for a better
investment environment. Moreover, the interaction between different parties can-
not be guaranteed merely by the growing disclosure trends, as shown in this
paper, since there is no proof – for the time being – that these parties would be
willing to benefit from each other’s information and participate in a constructive
dialogue. Therefore, under a more realistic scenario, this interaction could only
occur between parties that have already engaged in long-term strategies and are
in a position to link up with other parties following the same investment pattern.
Nevertheless, as was previously explained, it would be very risky to rely
exclusively upon those parties that have already acquired sophistication and
solid strategies for long-term investment for such a dialogue to occur. The
reason for this scepticism is that the dialogue would only occur between these
sophisticated parties and not regularly but when they would decide to develop
an ad hoc dialogue with another contractually related party in order to ensure
that their mutual objectives are met in a specific deal.
Therefore, acknowledging the perfectible character of disclosure trends as well
as the risk of instrumentalisation by the users of information, it seems more plau-
sible to invest in this regulatory path, whereby market participants are constantly
encouraged to disclose information about their strategies and to make opportunities
for dialogue with other participants more feasible. The availability of information
51 For a much more critical approach on this point, asserting that the “mandatory disclosure
requirement cannot be expected to increase the low levels of engagement because it neither
creates financial incentives nor lowers the cost of engagement. On the contrary, it may increase
costs if institutional investors feel pressured by their beneficiaries or others to increase their
engagement”, see Birkmose (2014, p. 236).
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will inevitably give rise to some speculative trends, but this would be offset by
increasing awareness amongst parties and allowing them – for the first time – to be
in a position to participate in a wider debate about balanced corporate governance
and long-term goals. It is the educational element of disclosure that needs to be
preserved even if some of its components will be sacrificed for short-term purposes.
Of course, such disclosure trends will function under the “comply or
explain” principle and therefore the “safety net” of this educational effort will
need to be strengthened with further efforts to convince parties that “compli-
ance” and “non-compliance” related information are both useful for awareness
and dialogue purposes.
The need to reconstruct the principle itself based on this new assumption is
made even more vital due to empirical studies, mentioned below, showing that
the main attitude of all involved parties is a mere “box ticking” approach and
there is no need for better understanding of the individual circumstances that
have driven a party to deviate from a set of rules.
4.2 The acceptability of the principle in both “compliance” and
“non-compliance” scenarios
According to data gathered from interviews conducted with CEOs from amongst the
130 largest listed firms in the UK and Germany, companies in both countries feel
under constant and increasing pressure to fully conform with all the principles of
their national corporate governance code even though the “comply or explain”
principle clearly allows them to deviate and provide a meaningful explanation for
such a choice. Therefore, even if deviation is essentially perfectly compatible with
the principle, in practice this opportunity is severely compromised since the con-
ception of compliance remains attached just to the “comply” part of the principle for
both companies and investors (Sanderson et al., 2013, p. 19). The constant pressure
to conform fully to a set of best practices attests to another fundamental issue which
refers to the inherent rigidity of the “comply or explain” principle up to a point where
the latter begins worryingly to resemble the “one-size-fits-all” approach of hard law
from which it was, purportedly, designed to escape. Indeed, although initially
designed with the aim to offer flexibility and “breathing space” to companies that,
for a certain period of time, may have found it more useful for their purposes not to
comply, the principle itself, as it is currently interpreted and used by the market, has
become so rigid that it seems practically impossible for a company to feel free not to
comply for fear of facing dissatisfaction from the investor community.
Bearing this element in mind, it would of course be utopic to neglect that the
twofold nature of the principle aims in essence to guide the regulatee towards
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formal compliance in the long term since the framework wherein it functions
consists of best practices and not ordinary practices that may include any kind of
practices, including alternatives to the best ones. In other words, the encourage-
ment and invitation to comply with a set of best practices may imply that the
latter are considered the preferred ones and that possible deviation is not always
the preferred outcome. This underlying rigidity of the principle, whereby all
regulatees are expected in essence to comply formally in the long run and not
to deviate, should be seriously challenged as, if it persists in the common
perception of the investor community, might have even worse repercussions on
regulatees than the current ones.
Does this mean that the original design of the “comply or explain” principle
considered that deviation should not necessarily have the same value and
therefore same amount of appreciation by the market when it is disclosed as
the regulatee’s position? It is our belief that the mechanistic perception of
compliance as well as superficial rejection of deviation does not have its origins
in the principle’s infancy but is mostly due to a distorted taste for “box ticking”
and automated use of services that favour form (simple declaration of compli-
ance) over substance (declaration of non-compliance along with explanations).
Of course, the superficial use of the principle and the automatic rejection of
deviations need also to be interpreted as a sign of mistrust in the market and
underlying belief that explanations will rarely inform the recipients of the informa-
tion disclosed in a realistic way. This has partially originated in the continuous
provision of perfunctory explanations by companies and risks expanding as a trend
if the regulatory framework does not intervene for the improvement of the content of
information in this area as well as the dialogue between market participants.
This ongoing situation should alarm all involved parties for the future of the
principle since it should be borne in mind that attachment to just one part of the
principle will make the whole disclosure process less convincing for future
regulatory measures in the capital markets sector. As has been wisely observed,
the “comply or explain” principle is essentially a
meta-legitimation mechanism in that it invites monitors to make judgments, not only on
the legitimacy of regulatee action but also on the overall legitimacy of the underlying code
and its provisions. They do this either in simplistically (and inappropriately) by counting
deviations or in a more nuanced way by examining the quality of explanations given for
deviating. (Sanderson et al., 2013, p. 4)
But adding to previous worrying signals, the natural and mechanistic preference
for “mere compliance” statements makes non-compliance statements even less
attractive, and therefore ultimately useless for informational purposes. Such
non-compliance statements tend to be perceived as a typical declaration about
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the impossibility of complying with the code, instead of triggering a further need
to understand the overall philosophy of the corporate strategy described in such
a statement. This situation can only reinforce the mechanistic use of the princi-
ple and weaken the need for more useful information since users would remain
focused on “formal compliance” and ignore the information accompanying
“non-compliance”. Market actors therefore run the risk of being increasingly
less interested in understanding the true reasons behind “non-compliance” and
favouring, almost automatically, mere compliance declarations without actually
really understanding the superficial information received.
In other words, if the future regulatory target is to change this dynamic, a non-
compliance statement, assuming it is well justified and gives useful insight into the
company’s philosophy and reasons for deviation, should not be considered a failure
in the company’s regulatory approach or compliance (Seidl, Sanderson, & Roberts,
2009). Companies’ most important task would therefore be the coherent disclosure
of their philosophy which, though possibly not sufficient at all costs, provides useful
data to investors and allows them to benefit much more from an enriching and
understandable statement that targets and analyses deviation from a set of rules.
This approach is strongly backed by the Financial Reporting Council (FRC), which
has already clarified in the most obvious way that “[w]hilst shareholders have every
right to challenge companies’ explanations if they are unconvincing, they should
not be evaluated in a mechanistic way, and departures from the Code should not be
automatically treated as breaches” (FRC, 2012c). The same emphasis is given in the
UK Stewardship Code (2012a, p. 4) but, quite surprisingly, is absent from the Best
Practice Principles for Shareholder Voting Research, prepared by the Best Practice
Principles Group (GBPP) (2014).
It is therefore essential to strengthen this “open culture” for explanations of
deviation from rules so that all parties can feel equally free to declare a deviation
without the fear of being automatically criticised, or even isolated, from the rest of
the market.52 To enshrine such a culture in market actors’ consciousness, soft
monitoring powers of the principle itself could be developed in order for monitoring
bodies to provide an official dialogue framework between all involved parties in the
investment chain and therefore give the “comply or explain” principle its full
potential. Indeed, our proposals in the third and final part of this paper aim to
show that since market participants have not been in a position or have avoided
making full use of both parts of the principle, a reorganisation of the framework
surrounding the principle should be put in place. This reorganisation needs to
consist of soft monitoring exercised by a Panel belonging to the national competent
52 Or “culture of departure from code recommendations” as it has been named by the
European Company Law Experts (2013, p. 6).
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authority and to which the paper will now turn. The main role of the Panel would
thus be to change the dynamics between various market participants and guide
them towards amuchmore “tolerant” perception of the principle, encouraging them
to develop their strategies more openly and to participate in a fruitful dialogue
instead of purely rejecting each other’s alternative positions.
4.3 The introduction of soft monitoring powers
4.3.1 Current monitoring trends
As previously mentioned, listed companies – contrary to institutional shareholders
and proxy advisors – are required to follow the principle based on the provisions of
Directive 2006/46/EC. The EC consequently investigated whether formal monitoring
powers should be given to competent national authorities in order to ensure full
respect with the “comply or explain” principle (Commission, 2011b). From the
consultation process, it became clear that the majority of respondents were openly
opposed to monitoring bodies assuming an active role in controlling disclosed
information (Commission, 2011c, 18). The main argument against such a scenario
was that the chance of convincing all involved parties to engage with each other in a
more open way and understand their respective strategies and priorities would be
lost once and for all, since attention would be taken away from the relationship
between market participants and would be exclusively focused on the relationship
between information providers and the national monitoring bodies.53
Undoubtedly, this opinion is not exempt from criticism because it could be also
asserted that the intervention of a monitoring process would add a third party,
namely a certifier, as is the case in the broad area of financial reporting.
Nevertheless, it should be borne in mind that the introduction of a “certifier” in
these kinds of statements, associated with corporate governance and stewardship
issues, is much less likely to play a key role than in the case of financial reporting.
This is due to the fact that it is much more complicated for a monitoring body to
control prospective/subjective information, which is inevitably and quintessentially
the majority of information related to corporate governance issues. Moreover, a
certifier would be subject to manipulation from companies since, after an eventual
“monitoring meeting/decision” that would certify their “compliant” status, compa-
nies could use it as a legitimate excuse not to engage further in corporate governance
issues with shareholders and stakeholders. Thiswould trigger the additional risk of a
53 See, for example, the very interesting comments provided by the European Company Law
Experts (2011, p. 20). See also Keay (2014, p. 298).
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lack of engagement, thus perpetuating the communication gap between various
parties. Although such a scenario cannot and should not be completely ruled out in
the future, it seems much more realistic to clarify the expectations that interested
parties should have from a formalmonitoring body and the dissociation of a possible
“compliance certification” to the benefit of a company, whose reporting quality has
been questioned, from its reluctance to engage with other market participants.
As the current regulatory framework stands, national authorities do not perform
any kind of supervisory function in the review of corporate governance statements,
with very few exceptions. For example, in the Netherlands, a formal monitoring
Committee (Monitoring Commissie Corporate Governance Code) was established in
2009. Its role is, amongst other things, to monitor compliance with the corporate
governance code and to examine the explanations provided by companies when
they do not comply with its provisions.54 The Committee also writes directly to
companies in the case of unsatisfactory explanations and asks them whether they
would like to provide an explanation about deviation from the provisions of the
Code. Although this effort is highly appreciated and clearly shows the advantages of
a soft monitoring framework, we must bear in mind that the Committee has not to
date named, positively or negatively, any company that has been subject to this
direct contact, precisely to preserve the confidentiality and ensure the efficiency of
the process. Moreover, the Committee ensures the monitoring process on its own
without being open to potential complaints by market actors regarding the unsatis-
factory quality of the information provided by companies. Therefore, this model
could be further enriched in the future with “naming” practices and a more partici-
pative approach from market actors who would be able to trigger the Committee’s
action, as will be shown later in this paper.
Another more passive trend that has gained a certain amount of popularity
is the involvement of national authorities in an overview of corporate govern-
ance statements leading to the publication of annual reports whose main pur-
pose is to inform the public on progress achieved in compliance rates and the
quality of explanations following the principle.55 This solution is much more apt
to encourage investors to understand the overall function of the code and its
respect by companies via the disclosure of information on an annual basis.
54 (Sanderson et al., 2013, p. 5). It seems that the Dutch Committee is quite successful in
striking the right balance in this regard since it keeps on engaging in “dialogue enhancing”
activities via the organisation of annual meetings with management board members, super-
visory directors and shareholders: for details, see Monitoring Committee (2013, p. 16).
55 See, for example, apart from the FRC in the UK, the French regulator’s (Autorité des Marchés
Financiers) Annual Reports on corporate governance, http://www.amf-france.org/affiche_plan.
asp?IdSec=6&IdRub=174&IdPlan=236&Id_Tab=0 accessed 17 March 2014.
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Some other authorities have engaged in a much more active consultation
approach, which seems to adopt a pedagogical stance in order to encourage
companies to engage in a fruitful dialogue with shareholders and stakeholders.
Nevertheless, this last approach does not appear to be fully appreciated by the
market, which continues to rely on its flexibility in order not to comply with
further guidance.56
A recent monitoring trend that emerged in France might influence other EU
Member States in finding a delicate – but questionable – compromise between
the traditional regulator’s neutrality and a slightly interventionist approach with
regard to respect of the principle. A private body (The High Committee in charge
of monitoring the implementation of the code) (Haut Comité de suivi de l’appli-
cation du code:AFEP-MEDEF, 2013, p. 33) composed of four personalities with
recognised experience from international groups and three personalities from
other sectors (investors, personalities selected for their competence in legal/
deontological issues) has assumed the role of monitoring the application of
the principles contained in the Afep–Medef corporate governance code as well
as proposing updates to the code. The members of the Committee are nominated
and appointed by Afep (the French Association of Private Enterprises) and Medef
(the French Business Confederation) for a period of 3 years, renewable once, and
they also have to declare their directorships in listed companies. The chairman
of the Committee is selected amongst the four personalities of the corporate
sector and the committee has to produce an activity report on an annual basis.
The committeemay receive companies’ questions on corporate governance code
interpretation issues but also retains the right to contact companies and ask for more
information in the absence of meaningful explanation. It should also be noted that
companies that choose not to follow the recommendations of the Committee must
mention this fact in their annual report/reference document and explain why they
have adopted this position (Haut Comité de suivi de l’application du code:AFEP-
MEDEF, 2013, p. 33). Therefore, companies will be invited to proceed to a second
level of informational exposure following again the “comply or explain” principle
with regard to the outcome of the contact with the Committee.
Several points of this private monitoring mechanism could be noteworthy and
subject to criticism. First of all, introducing a private monitoring body to follow the
application of a corporate governance code may, in the long term, weaken the role
that competent national authorities play in this field. This is because private forces
are trying to create a parallel institutional structure not just in the rulemaking
56 See, for example, the FRC’s overall regulatory approach and, more specifically, the effort
conducted in 2012 and which led to the publication of FRC (2012b). Unfortunately, as previously
stated, companies have not followed the guidance provided in this document by the FRC.
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process, via the adoption of soft law measures applicable to their sector, but also in
the monitoring process, via the introduction of private monitoring bodies that are
supposed to control the application of these measures by companies. This new
“private hierarchical structure”, whereby market actors make their own rules, base
their disclosure choices on the flexibility of the “comply or explain” principle, and
control its application themselves, might indeed become problematic in the future, if
expanded to other EUMember States, in terms of both legitimacy and efficiency. This
phenomenon is inextricably associated with the decades-long trend towards finan-
cialisation (Biondi, 2013, p. 391) in our economy and society in general, and it clearly
shows that not only the conception of the purpose of corporations and their position
in the financial markets, which have become predominant in economies, but also
the assumption of control of their practices as well as the assurance of their
compliance can be efficiently issued and delivered by the private sector.
Nevertheless, the fallacy of this ideological construction is that the private sector is
a priori unsuitable to exercise such a function due to its dual capacity as “monitor-
ing/monitored” field of activity. Under such a scenario, it is highly unlikely that a
neutral monitoring process can be conducted efficiently without any capture by
industry interests. Indeed, wemust remember that the control function, if any in this
area, should remain under the responsibility of national regulators in order to ensure
the necessary levels of independence and legitimacy.
Secondly, allowing a more institutionalised dialogue between companies
and the Committee, regardless of which party decides to initiate the contact,
excludes a priori all other market participants from being allowed to contact the
Committee and eventually complain about the deficiency of the information
disclosed. The current framework therefore restricts the field of application of
this mechanism and might risk creating a “one-to-one” conception of dialogue
between companies and the Committee, while excluding a much more holistic
approach for the Committee’s openness with the public.
Thirdly, under this framework, companies are required to indicate in their
annual report/reference document whether they have followed the recommen-
dations of the Committee and, if not, to explain the reasons they have decided
not to do so. There seems to be a twofold problem in this requirement: on the
one hand, it is rather useless for investors to be informed about the outcome of
the contact with the Committee upon disclosure of the annual report/reference
document since this disclosure might occur a long time after the actual meeting
took place. In other words, it would be preferable to require companies or the
Committee to disclose the outcome of this meeting to the market immediately so
that investors are informed in due time. On the other hand, requiring companies
to follow the “comply or explain” framework in order to justify possible devia-
tions from the Committee’s recommendations, risks adding further interpretation
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problems to the poor quality of their explanations or a lack of compliance in
general. This is particularly true since companies contacted by the Committee
for not having sufficiently respected the “comply or explain” framework in the
first place are much less likely to respect it in a satisfactory way if they decide
that they want to deviate from the Committee’s recommendations. Therefore, the
flexibility offered during the “post-Committee” phase is not of great help in
making sure that companies disclose at least a posteriori more meaningful
information to the Committee and the market.
As previously mentioned, all these efforts are positive signs of a constantly-
changing perception of monitoring, but the persisting shortfalls of the principle
should continue to prompt further reflection on a regulatory model slightly
different from the rigidity of an official supervisory mechanism (the
Netherlands) or the questionable efficiency of a private Committee (France)
and will, in a holistic approach, encourage all parties involved to disclose
information in a “culturally tolerant” but institutionalised environment.
4.3.2 The introduction of Review Panels
4.3.2.1 An “institutionalised dialogue” spectrum
The advantages of a softer monitoring process, compared to a stringent mon-
itoring approach by national competent authorities, are more suitable to all the
above-mentioned challenges, especially taking into consideration the fact that,
to date, the only binding framework applying the “comply or explain” concept
is the one applicable to listed companies. If therefore the desire is to unblock
engagement amongst listed companies, institutional investors and proxy advi-
sors – bearing in mind that investors and advisors are currently encouraged
and not required to sign best practice Principles – a soft monitoring mechan-
ism could be applied by newly established Review Panels forming part of
national authorities. Such Review Panels could deal with the entire disclosure
chain, namely from the required disclosure arising from Corporate Governance
Codes, Stewardship Codes and the Best Practice Principles for Shareholder
Voting Research. Although we cannot yet say exactly which regulatory direc-
tion will be followed at the EU level in an EU Stewardship Code or the future
regulatory framework applicable to proxy advisors,57 it is essential to start
57 Bearing in mind that ESMA has reserved the right to adopt more stringent measures in the
future in case GBPP’s efforts do not bring about the desired outcomes. Moreover, it would not be
unreasonable nor utopic to see the implementation of a holistic regulatory approach in the
future, including in a soft law initiative the entirety of involved parties in the investment chain
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preparing the ground at the national level for better interaction between
corporate participants. This kind of preparation on enhanced interaction at
the national level will therefore be able to enshrine the necessary principles
and best practices into the collective market mentality, which will then be
much more susceptible to accept any future regulatory framework, acknowl-
edging the advantages of sharing the same transparency level with other
interested parties.
In other words, even if regulatory efforts are escalated purely at the EU level,
newly established Review Panels can legitimately provide market participants
with guidance at the national level and offer a more formal “dialogue spectrum”
in case they are notified by a party that considers the information provided to be
unsatisfactory.58
4.3.2.2 A clear and delineated authority
For the Review Panel’s activity to be efficient and legitimate, its composition and
the spectrum of its authority must be clearly identified and delineated.
The composition of the Panel should be as diverse as possible in order to
gain immediate acceptance by all market participants as well as to spark interest
in participating in its activities. Company directors (executive and non-execu-
tive), retail and institutional investors, proxy advisors, as well as investment
consultants should be eligible to be elected members of the Panel, along with
the employees of the national competent authority, for a maximum period of 3
years. Membership should also be open to other stakeholder groups (unions,
customer representatives and others) under the condition that they have devel-
oped considerable experience in interacting with market participants and pro-
moting a majority of sustainable investment projects. The “considerable
experience” criterion would further strengthen the useful character of the dis-
cussions taking place in this framework as well as the quality of the dialogue
developed in these discussions. The members’ mandate would not be renewable
to avoid increased familiarity with recurrent cases and, more generally, to
maintain the merits of rotation in terms of independence and diversity of
Panel composition, allowing more representatives from the same sector a chance
to serve on the Panel.
(e.g. including investment consultants, etc.) sharing the same exposure via the adoption of
similar disclosure obligations.
58 This proposal was initially advanced in one of our previous studies but it had a narrower
focus since it was exclusively dedicated to the “comply or explain” principle in corporate
governance statements: Sergakis (2013).
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The eligibility criteria for members should be their considerable experience
in their professional activities or substantial proof of their beneficial contribu-
tion to establishing better communication with other market participants. The
second eligibility criterion could, for example, apply to an asset owner or
manager who has proven to be innovative not just in financial performance
terms but in creating and maintaining useful communication methods with
concrete outcomes, while conducting dialogue with investee companies or
proxy advisors. This criterion should thus allow more junior, but active and
innovative, professionals to gain additional recognition in their field by partici-
pating in the Panel’s activities. More generally, creating a diverse composition
for the Panel should motivate market participants to be increasingly interested
in its activities.
With regard to the spectrum of the Panel’s authority, the focus should
primarily be on three areas that have by now become, or are increasingly
becoming, commonly discussed in disclosure-related debates. These areas
are the existence of conflicts of interest, the methodologies adopted in the
exercise of professional activities, and the interaction with other market parti-
cipants and the public. Although more activities could fall within the Panel’s
remit in the future, it is our belief that, at least for an initial 5-year period, the
scope of the claims should be primarily restricted to these three broad areas.
The reason for this preference is due to the inevitably diverse rate of progres-
sion at the national level with regard to the development of a dialogue and the
sophistication rate of national authorities, as well as cultural and social
components that may affect the efficiency of the whole process as well as the
participation rate in the Panel’s activities, both in terms of the frequency of the
claims raised and the level of cooperation by the invited party. Moreover, such
an initial authority spectrum would match up more harmoniously with the
current national and EU regulatory efforts that tend to focus increasingly on
these three areas. It would then remain to be seen whether the Panels would
eventually converge in the way they would exercise their activities and interact
with market participants for such an authority to be enlarged and to include
any corporate governance-related matters in the future. This would also allow
these three areas to receive more attention and start becoming more accessible
to market participants both in terms of their management and their common
understanding.
We must also bear in mind that, dealing with a variety of claims and aiming
to avoid any potential abuse of its role or instrumentalisation by the parties, the
Panel should not be in a position to interfere with purely contractual matters
that normally provide a clear framework for the parties’ relationship and would
not necessitate the development of a dialogue under its guidance.
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With regard to potential cases being launched, a party asking for the Panel’s
intervention could be an investor complaining about the quality of the information
disclosed by a listed company, an institutional investor or even a proxy advisor.
Other configurations would also be possible. For example, a listed company could
complain about a proxy advisory firm that avoids engagement and then mechan-
istically rejects its corporate resolutions without analysing them in-depth or seek-
ing contact with the company. Therefore, potentially all market participants could
be interested in considering the Panel’s intervention since they would all draw
benefits from such an initiative and they would all seek a better resolution of their
communication gap with other parties.
It would also be necessary to define clear criteria for a Review Panel to be
able to allow a request to be put forward and trigger a more active dialogue with
the other party. Generally speaking, these criteria could be a detailed explana-
tion of the disclosure-related issue, as well as the implications of the supposed
informational deficiency for the claimant party’s affairs. Moreover, the claimant
party should provide proof that communication had already been sought, as
well as a reasonable explanation as to why the party considers that the outcome
of this initiative did not prove fruitful, namely in the case that the party
concerned did not cooperate or its corporation did not met the expectations of
the claimant party.
Provided that the request for further examination is well argued and sound,
the Review Panel would be in a position to invite the party concerned to attend a
meeting for further discussion of the subject, which could entail failure to
update the “compliance” statement or the disclosure of perfunctory “non-com-
pliance” explanations. Confidential information should also be protected in this
framework, and the relevant rules applicable to the Panel’s functioning should
clearly allow parties not to disclose any information for which they have a
legitimate interest to maintain confidentiality. Corporate secrecy needs to be
included for some delicate matters that, although they may be able to trigger a
more fruitful dialogue, may compromise the position of one of the parties
involved and have negative repercussions on a larger scale.
The invited party would be given the chance to express its views on the
disputed matter, present its own version of the alleged facts as presented by the
claimant party, and possibly show that steps have been taken to remediate this
situation or even improve the informational context in the future. Under this
assumption, the Review Panel would be expected to provide guidance on further
actions to ensure that improvement will occur. Guidance should remain always
neutral and should focus on general recommendations that could correspond to
already existing guidance notes of various soft law texts currently applicable at
the national level.
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However, if the party does not wish to attend the meeting or attends but without
showing a real willingness to cooperate and improve its practices, the Review Panel
would have the right to publish a statement summarising the position adopted by
this party or outcomes of the meeting. Reputational sanctions and “name and
shame” practices would therefore apply in this framework, anticipating that other
market participants would evaluate the outcome of this procedure. The Review
Panel would therefore remain completely neutral on the persuasiveness of the
arguments presented by the party and would only make public its guidance, the
dialogue that took place, and the overall outcome of the procedure. Therefore, even
if a party considers itself to have formally satisfied the recommendations of the
Review Panel, it will not be in a position to hide behind any regulatory approval and
ignore similar complaints that may arise in the future.
Maintaining the Panel’s neutrality is the key to the success of such a
proposed monitoring mechanism, since the Panel will only offer the chance to
the concerned parties to express their views and explain their respective argu-
ments further. The Panel will provide the necessary guidance to ensure that the
context of the regulatory tool (Corporate Governance Code, Stewardship Code,
Best Practice Principles for Shareholder Voting Research) is respected given the
individual circumstances of the examined case.
We thus believe that the introduction of such an “institutionalised dialogue
spectrum” will transmit the message to the market that the existence of a Review
Panel ensuring transparency over complaints about the quality of information
provided is widely applicable and therefore may have the potential to encourage
market actors to cooperate further with the Panel and have a chance to justify
their positions. The absence of legal sanctions will preserve the incentive for
market actors to be more open and will make the Panel seem less intimidating.
This proposal is not exempt criticism, especially with regard to the costs
involved in the running of the Panel, both in terms of time spent for the examina-
tion of all possible complaints and in terms of human resources needed to staff it
adequately. Undoubtedly, the related costs will be an important factor but may be
well justified depending on the balance between different priorities and preroga-
tives for the future investment landscape. In other words, if the main purpose of
financial regulation is to intervene more actively and impose more stringent
requirements on all market actors, this will inevitably be a well justified regulatory
objective and may even be a case in the not so distant future. However, as
previously mentioned, before that decision can be made at an institutional level,
regulators need to ask a much more fundamental question: is soft law still a viable
solution for capital markets and behavioural change amongst participants?
If the answer to this question is yes, then the undoubted benefits of regulatory
flexibility and soft law rulemaking should not be immediately eliminated. The
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reason for this argument is that, as shown in this paper, the main problem with
soft law rules and the “comply or explain” principle is not their inability to
function as a convincing regulatory tool. It is rather the exploitation of regulatory
flexibility by regulatees and the mechanistic use by information recipients that
makes the principle less convincing. Thus, current regulatory initiatives should
focus instead on how the distorted perception of the “comply or explain” principle
can be remedied in order to restore its efficiency. Abandoning the principle or
integrating it into a hard law framework associated with dissuasive legal sanc-
tions will inevitably shift the focus from the need for a behavioural change
towards the need for sanctioning continued short-term and opaque behaviour.59
Although this scenario cannot – and probably should not – be avoided in the
future, it is in the best interests of regulators and markets to make sure to exploit
the unique opportunity they have in the wake of the recent financial crisis: give
market participants a last chance to engage with each other in an attempt,
through legitimate compromise and mutual acceptance, to reach a collective
consensus on the future of capital markets and each party’s role therein.
As previously mentioned, the flexibility of soft law measures has been
traditionally, if not conceived, at least instrumentalised to function as a convin-
cing excuse for the maintenance and expansion of a financialised corporate
governance framework. It is therefore legitimate to question this instrumentali-
sation and seek new ways to make soft law measures much more efficient by
protecting them from attempts to make them a fruitless pedagogical and idea-
listic exercise between market participants. We firmly believe that the introduc-
tion of a soft monitoring framework will give the debate between various
participants renewed potential to achieve something concrete instead of ending
up being considered another gentle “window-dressing” exercise.
In order for such an initiative to succeed, all parties involved in this
dialogue would need to be guided by the Review Panel in terms of what they
59 It should be borne in mind that a hard law framework does not necessarily have this
persuasive function because it is associated with sanctions and with a rather “reprimanding”
connotation when the rule is violated. Inevitably, participants’ actions might change more
quickly with hard law because they will try to avoid sanctions but this will not necessarily
transform their mentality.
An obvious example is the continuous violation of disclosure obligations from listed compa-
nies notwithstanding the presence of a hard law framework in this area. Moreover, other factors
need to be taken into consideration, namely enforcement and surveillance, that, if not ensured
in an efficient way, will keep on hampering sanctions’ dissuasive force. Although some
optimism should be allowed, especially with regard to national competent authorities, who
have started raising the quantum of sanctions the past few years, civil remedies and criminal
sanctions still necessitate further improvement and action both at EU and at national levels.
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can expect from its presence, its contribution to the debate and its level of
intervention. They will also need to acknowledge in advance that this soft
monitoring framework aims exclusively to provide an “institutionalised frame-
work” for them to interact and try to understand each other’s priorities and
positions, while offering some guidance for this dialogue to lead to a better
understanding of the situation that triggered the Panel’s intervention. Bearing
these two elements in mind, the Panel will then try to provide the necessary
educational background to the parties involved and show them that dialogue
does not necessarily mean only vulnerable exposure to the rest of the market
that can be instrumentalised, but a case that can strengthen their position by
presenting a series of convincing arguments in defence of their strategies.
If we take into consideration the fact that mechanisms such as “comply or
explain” have not been taken seriously, or even worse have been instrumenta-
lised, by the providers and recipients of the information disclosed, the contribu-
tion stemming from the regulatory framework needs to be the preservation of the
system and, most importantly, the education of its users, who are ultimately
responsible for the efficiency of the mechanism. This type of education can more
feasibly occur within the scope of a neutral Review Panel that will continue to
deal with various requests and to guide the parties involved in realising the
benefits of engagement in each and every occasion for dialogue.
While “education” and “trust” are words that have been traditionally identified
with idealistic or utopic goals, we must remind ourselves that capital markets are
still composed of individuals who seek profit regardless of their position, responsi-
bilities or power, as well as the possibility or willingness for interaction with other
participants. If the market has become so fragmented and interaction practically
impossible, lawmakers and regulators must find ways to change the dynamics of an
extremely complicated system and to place some common principles at the heart of
the investment community. These principles should be the common perception of
the primary purpose of capital markets, corporations and investment. Although
these principles continue to be hotly debated and a common solution to the
satisfaction of all parties involved cannot easily be reached, the purpose of educa-
tion will be to reorient their short-term goals for profit and show them that if they
work collectively they may have a chance to achieve the same profit under a long-
term perspective without compromising their position, while preserving in the
meantime the stability of the system since speculation would not be their unique
goal in the market.
This does not mean that speculation would disappear from capital markets
since it will necessarily take years to reach a common understanding of why and
how all parties try to generate profit. But the educational foundations of the
regulatory framework would mean that people who participate in the market
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need to understand the overall ramifications of their actions not only for other
participants but for the viability of markets themselves, on which they will have
to keep relying in order to achieve their purposes.
In order for such understanding to take place and for parties to be able to
distinguish when they need to adopt short-term or long-term strategies, aware-
ness of their counterparties’ position will be crucial. This will be better achieved
under a generalised and regular dialogue framework, wherein such a need to
communicate further and launch an additional level of dialogue can be triggered
by one of these parties by contacting the Review Panel. Therefore, the proposed
soft monitoring framework does have a role to play.
5 Conclusion
This paper has endeavoured to show the proliferation of the “comply or explain”
principle as well as its current perception by regulatees and users. This ideolo-
gical “deconstruction” of the principle showed the need for its “reconstruction”
via enhanced interaction between market actors and the development of a more
tolerant culture with regard to compliance statements. To overcome the ramifi-
cations of the financial crisis, some of the distinctive features of which were
linked to a failure of modern investment culture, a better understanding of how
market actors perceive each other’s informational exposure is vital. This under-
standing, as we partially attempted in this paper, is aimed at facilitating the
adoption of efficient measures that will not just encourage but actually ensure
that market participants respect a common set of principles about sharing the
same transparency prerogative and responsibilities arising from their activities
in the investment chain. It comes as a natural conclusion that for such objective
to be achieved, regulators must find ways not only to sanction illegal or “non-
compliant” behaviour but, most importantly and as a preventive measure, to
facilitate communication, engagement and constant interaction.
Acknowledging the need to provide a more pedagogical and educational
framework for complaints can be heard and discussed, Review Panels should be
in a position to offer this framework and contribute, gradually but steadily, to
this educational purpose. As all market actors are now expected to adopt a long-
term investment culture, the associated costs with the function of these Panels
should also be seen as a long-term investment for the shaping of a sound
regulatory culture that seeks not only to sanction regulatees but also to guide
them towards adopting sound investment strategies. The road to adopting the
preferred delivery framework will undoubtedly be a very long and arduous one,
and the above-mentioned proposal is by no means the ideal solution to achieve
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the desired outcomes. Nevertheless, it could be a realistically achievable initia-
tive that could be legitimately pursued at the national level. Most importantly, it
might serve as a last resort mechanism for the legitimisation of the “comply or
explain” principle before the latter radically loses its flexible characteristics and
is transformed into a much more stringent approach or simply abandoned. Hard
law can possibly be legitimately seen as a last resort solution, at least for the
time being, depending on whether regulators still believe that there is room for
behavioural change and incentivising market actors to adopt a long-term invest-
ment culture. This will inevitably be the most challenging task in the years to
come, not only for the regulatory reactiveness but, most importantly, for market
participants to show that they are willing to participate in a new, less financia-
lised and more holistic investment environment.
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